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ABSTRACT
A tenet of behavioral economics is that biases are systematic and should have visible effects in
economic applications. Expected utility maximization has been widely applied in economics, but
progress has been slower incorporating 'systematically biased' agents into applications involving
risk. This contrasts with the widespread application of present-biased preferences in intertemporal
settings. To address this gap, we advocate a model of quasi-rank dependent probability weighting
as a natural risky choice analog to quasi-hyperbolic time discounting. The model provides a
formulation of ‘security bias’ – a disproportionate preference for lotteries with larger minimum
payoffs, which unifies the certainty effect and loss aversion. The model satisfies stochastic
dominance and transitivity and transforms individual rather than cumulative probabilities. We
illustrate the model’s tractability, demonstrating that it predicts the optimal purchase of insurance
at actuarially unfair prices, the existence of gaps between buying and selling prices, and potential
market failure due to security bias. The model also demonstrates that markets can generate
unbiased prices even if all traders are systematically biased. A generalization of the model
produces an asset pricing formula in which an asset’s price depends on its fundamental value, a
risk premium, a positive skewness premium, and a premium for robustness to model uncertainty.
We also extend the model to time preferences, resulting in a ‘three-factor’ model of behavioral
biases with factors reflecting (positive) skewness preference, present bias, and security bias. We
demonstrate that this three-factor model predicts eight prominent behavioral anomalies in the
literature for decisions under risk and over time.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The expected utility (EU) model has been the workhorse of economic analysis since it was
axiomatized by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern nearly seventy years ago 1. It was
swiftly applied to decisions involving insurance (Friedman and Savage, 1948), the existence of
mixed strategy equilibria in non-cooperative games (Nash 1950a, 1951), cooperative bargaining
theory (Nash, 1950b) and optimal portfolio selection (Tobin 1958; Markowitz, 1959). With the
rise of information economics, EU became the micro foundation for analyzing games and markets
under asymmetric information. It has penetrated the barriers into neighboring disciplines, finding
application in political science, evolutionary biology, and sociology. Even one of its greatest critics
has referred to EU as “the most important theory in the social sciences” (Kahneman 2011, p. 270).
Almost since its adoption, however, EU has been subject to persistent challenges, most notably
due to Allais (1953). Allais introduced two paradoxes – the common consequence effect and the
common ratio effect in which many people frequently reveal a bias toward certainty that violates
the independence axiom - one of the central assumptions of EU. Motivated by the premise that
more accurate assumptions would lead to more accurate predictions, or perhaps that EU imposed
too stringent a definition of rationality, research in the late 1970’s began to experiment with
weakening the axioms of EU, or modifying its basic functional form to better accommodate
empirical evidence such as the Allais paradoxes.
One of the earliest approaches to generalizing EU involved transforming individual probabilities
in accordance with some probability weighting function to give the model greater flexibility
(Edwards 1954; Karmarkar 1978; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This approach was abandoned
however, when it was recognized that transforming individual probabilities seems to lead
inevitably to violations of first-order stochastic dominance, a fundamental principle of rational
choice which is rarely violated in experiments (Diecidue and Wakker, 2001).
Quiggin (1982) provided an elegant solution to the problem of transforming probabilities while
preserving stochastic dominance. His rank dependent utility (RDU) model made the basic
observation that to satisfy stochastic dominance, a probability weighting model should account for
the rank of payoffs in a lottery and transform cumulative rather than individual probabilities. The
probability transformations in RDU were subsequently incorporated into cumulative prospect

1

See Bleichrodt et al. (2016) for the conclusion that John Nash and Jacob Marschak were the first to provide a
complete axiomatization of EU in their 1950 papers in the same issue of Econometrica (Marschak 1950; Nash 1950b).
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theory (CPT) by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which is widely viewed today as the leading
descriptive model of choices under risk (Fox et al., 2015).
Without delving into a debate regarding the strengths or limitations of CPT in describing human
behavior, we make a different point – that CPT has generally lagged far behind EU in terms of
economic applications. Reflecting on thirty years of prospect theory, Barberis (2013, p.173)
comments, “It is curious, then, that so many years after the publication of the 1979 paper, there
are relatively few well-known and broadly accepted applications of prospect theory in economics.”
This observation is in contrast to the domain of choices over time where the model of quasihyperbolic discounting has already been ‘plugged in’ to a wide variety of applications ranging
from consumption and saving decisions (e.g., Angeletos et al., 2001; Diamond and Koszegi,
2003), problems of self-control (Laibson et al., 1998), addiction (Khwaja et al., 2007), credit card
usage (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Meier and Sprenger, 2010) and bilateral bargaining (Kodritsch, 2014),
even though it was popularized in a paper published nearly 20 years after prospect theory (Laibson,
1997). With regard to the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, Prelec (2006, p. 334) comments:
“It is arguably the single most productive theoretical innovation associated with behavioral
economics, overshadowing prospect theory in the breadth of applications.”
One might be led to wonder why prospect theory has seen relatively limited application, despite
being described in survey articles as “the most successful general-purpose model currently
available for predicting, describing, and interpreting decisions under risk” (Fox et al., 2015).
We suggest that a potential answer to this question lies in the observation made by Prelec. Both
CPT and the quasi-hyperbolic model of time preference formalize systematic deviations from the
standard models of rational choice. CPT captures a variety of different biases (e.g., the Allais
paradoxes, loss aversion, risk aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses) as arising from
different components of the model (probability weighting, reference dependence, diminishing
sensitivity). As the value function is defined over gains and losses rather than final wealth, and as
multiple components of the model generate different effects, CPT does not always lend itself to
produce clean comparisons with EU. In contrast, the quasi-hyperbolic model focuses on one
important deviation from the standard discounted utility (DU) theory (present bias), and captures
this bias through a single parameter which facilitates very clean comparisons with DU. Rather than
taking a comprehensive approach, the quasi-hyperbolic model has its own descriptive limitationsits strength lies in the simplicity in which it captures an important behavior. The generality and
3

comprehensiveness of CPT is impressive, but it is difficult to plug in CPT to game theoretic
settings, or markets, or to represent agents in an economy and derive closed solutions the way that
this can be done in the simple quasi-hyperbolic model. Indeed, Machina (1989) writes that the
theoretical goal of descriptive decision models “is to show that non-expected utility models of
individual decision making can be used to conduct analyses of standard economic decisions under
uncertainty, such as insurance, gambling, investment, or search, in a manner that at least
approximates the elegance and power of expected utility analysis” (p. 1623). For this purpose, it
may be desirable to have a model of risky choice that is analogous to the quasi-hyperbolic model.
While the quasi-hyperbolic model is a standard generalization of DU which incorporates
systematically biased agents, there is no standard recipe to incorporate systematically biased agents
who deviate from EU into economic applications involving risk. Given the preceding discussion,
one might raise the question of whether there is a natural analog to quasi-hyperbolic discounting
for decisions under risk which generalizes EU to capture systematic biases, but which is also
portable to a variety of economic applications. We argue that the answer to this question appears
to be ‘yes’ and the resulting model appears to be one of ‘quasi-rank dependent' utility (QRD). The
QRD model formalizes ‘security bias’ – a disproportionate preference for lotteries with higher
minimum payoffs. The QRD model satisfies basic axioms of rational choice such as transitivity
and stochastic dominance, and transforms individual rather than cumulative probabilities. This
observation may be surprising since it is widely believed that models which transform individual
probabilities necessarily violate stochastic dominance or transitivity (Diecidue et al., 2004; Dhami,
2016). Yet QRD retains each of these properties. In contrast, models that overweight outcomes
which occur with certainty do violate transitivity or stochastic dominance (Neilson, 1992; Schmidt
1998; Bleichrodt and Schmidt 2002; Diecidue et al., 2004; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2010). The
QRD model is the special case of the non-extreme outcome additive (NEO-additive) model
(Schmidt 2000; Chateauneuf et al., 2007; Webb and Zank 2011) which preserves risk aversion.
After outlining the quasi-rank dependent (QRD) model in Section II, we consider behavioral
implications (Section III) and apply QRD to optimal insurance decisions (Section IV), prediction
markets (Section V), and auctions (Section VI). Section VII extends QRD to account for optimism
and pessimism. Section VIII applies the model to finance. Section IX extends QRD to both risk
and time preferences. Section X discusses the related literature. Section XI concludes. Proofs for
Sections III and IX are provided in the Appendix. Other proofs are in the main text.
4

II.

QUASI-RANK DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY

Let 𝑋 ⊂ ℝ denote a finite set of possible outcomes. A lottery, 𝑓, is a probability distribution
on 𝑋. Denote the set of lotteries by ∆(𝑋). Consider model (1) where 𝑥(𝑓) is the minimum outcome
in the support of 𝑓, 𝑈(𝑓) = ∑𝑥∈𝑋 𝑓(𝑥) ⋅ 𝑢(𝑥) and 𝜃 ∈ [0,1]:
(1)

𝑉(𝑓) = 𝜃[𝑈(𝑓)] + (1 − 𝜃)[𝑢(𝑥(𝑓))],

Model (1) takes the convex combination of the expected utility and the minimum utility of the
lottery and can be interpreted as a disproportionate preference for lotteries with larger minimum
payoffs. We refer to this behavior as ‘security bias’ since lotteries with higher minimum payoffs
offer greater ‘security’ to the decision maker by limiting the worst-case scenario. Security bias can
be quantified by 1 − 𝜃. We show that security bias offers a unified explanation for the certainty
effect (the Allais paradox and common ratio effect) and loss aversion (aversion to symmetric small
mixed gambles) for choices under risk (in Section III), and that security bias generates the sign
effect in intertemporal choice (in Section IX). If probabilities are subjective, security bias can also
reflect a preference for robustness to mis-specified beliefs, and indeed, it reduces to Wald’s (1950)
maximin rule when 𝜃 = 0, which is widely used in robust decision making under uncertainty.
Model (1) first appeared explicitly in Schmidt (2000), although a variant of (1) was introduced
in Gilboa (1988). An analogous model to (1) for decisions under ambiguity is characterized in
Kopylov (2009). Model (1) also appears as a special case of the model in Webb and Zank (2011)
which allows for both optimistic and pessimistic behavior. However, despite the simplicity of (1)
and its convenient properties, it has received almost no attention in applications.
There are several related behavioral interpretations for (1). The minimum payoff of a lottery may
be salient in the mind of the decision maker and 1 − 𝜃 then reflects disproportionate attention
allocated to that payoff, where attention is a limited resource. A decision maker might also
overweight the worst outcome in a lottery’s support because it carries valuable information that is
not shared by the other outcomes – namely it informs the decision maker prior to his decision what
is the most he can be guaranteed from that lottery with certainty. Alternatively, a pessimistic
decision maker who feels ‘unlucky’ or who ‘expects the worse’ may over-weight the worst
outcome in a lottery’s support. An axiomatic foundation for (1) is given by Webb and Zank (2011).
Instead, we will focus on behavioral implications, applications, and extensions of the model.
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To begin, we note that (1) has an equivalent representation as a model of quasi-rank dependent
utility. Let 𝑋𝑓 denote a random variable associated with 𝑓. Let ≿ denote a binary (preference)
relation on ∆(𝑋), with strict preference and indifference represented by ≻ and ~, respectively.
Definition 1: (Quasi-Rank Dependent Utility): Under Quasi-Rank Dependent (QRD) utility
theory, there exists utility function, 𝑢, probability weighting function 𝜋, with 𝜋(0) = 0, 𝜋(1) = 1,
and ∑𝑥∈𝑋 𝜋(𝑓(𝑥)) = 1, and a unique parameter 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] such that for any 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ ∆(𝑋), 𝑓 ≿ 𝑔
if and only if 𝑉(𝑓) ≥ 𝑉(𝑔), where for all 𝑥 in the support of 𝑓:
(2)

𝑉(𝑓) = ∑𝑥∈𝑋 𝜋(𝑓(𝑥)) ∙ 𝑢(𝑥), 𝜋(𝑓(𝑥)) = {

1 − 𝜃 + 𝜃𝑓(𝑥), 𝑃(𝑋𝑓 ≥ 𝑥) = 1
𝜃𝑓(𝑥), 𝑃(𝑋𝑓 ≥ 𝑥) < 1

Note that the weights sum to 1. Somewhat surprisingly, the simple probability weighting function
in (2) has not yet appeared in the literature. The formula in Definition 1 is a tractable “quasi-rankdependent” probability weighting model which satisfies both stochastic dominance and
transitivity. In addition, it is straightforward to test expected utility theory in this setup by testing
if 𝜃 = 1. The parameter 𝜃 ∈ [0,1] indexes a decision maker’s degree of security bias – the extent
to which the agent deviates from expected utility maximization in the direction consistent with the
certainty effect (Allais, 1953) and loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) with greater bias
for lower values of 𝜃. A rational unbiased agent corresponds to 𝜃 = 1. This approach transforms
individual probabilities (rather than cumulative probabilities). It is ‘quasi-rank-dependent’ since
the weight is different for the lowest ranked outcome, but all other outcomes receive the same
weight. For further intuition, consider an analogy to choice over time. Note that (2) is somewhat
analogous to the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (3) which has discount function 𝑑(𝑡), and
consumption stream (𝑥0 , 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑇 ) is evaluated as (3) where 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]:
(3)

𝑊(𝑥0 , 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑇 ) = ∑𝑡 𝑑(𝑡) ∙ 𝑢(𝑥𝑡 ) and (𝑡) = {
A.

1, 𝑡 = 0
.
𝛽𝛿 𝑡 , 𝑡 > 0

Certainty Preference or Security Bias?

Previous work has led to the impression that the analog to quasi-hyperbolic discounting under risk
is a model of ‘certainty preference’ with weights assigned to probabilities depending on whether
𝑓(𝑥) = 1 or 𝑓(𝑥) < 1. However, such models necessarily violate either stochastic dominance or
transitivity (e.g., Diecidue et al., 2004). Yet because such models capture the certainty effect,
which is viewed as a risky choice analog to present bias (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; Halevy
2008), it seems unavoidable that such models are the appropriate analog to quasi-hyperbolic
6

discounting. This conclusion is disappointing since it is generally agreed that any normative model
should satisfy both stochastic dominance and transitivity, and those axioms are rarely violated in
experiments (e.g., Blavatskyy (2010), Regenwetter et al. (2011) and Baillon et al. (2014)).
Upon closer inspection, however, it seems that such models do not capture certainty preference
in an intuitive way: They allow for situations, for example, where a person chooses a guaranteed
$10 over a 50-50 chance of gaining $11 or gaining $12, merely because the former is ‘certain’. It
seems plausible, at least in such cases, that certainty is better viewed as the ‘minimum guarantee’
of a lottery. Under this view, certainty preference would predict choosing the non-degenerate
lottery since the former guarantees $10 whereas the latter guarantees at least $11. This observation
suggests that a more appropriate analog assigns different weights to the probability of outcome 𝑥
depending on if 𝑃(𝑋𝑓 ≥ 𝑥) = 1 or 𝑃(𝑋𝑓 ≥ 𝑥) < 1.
It also appears that models which assign different weights to probabilities depending on
whether 𝑓(𝑥) = 1 or 𝑓(𝑥) < 1 do not capture the behavior of most subjects who exhibit the Allais
paradox. For instance, Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher (2016) conducted a novel test of Allais-style
violations of EU in which they replaced the common consequence across a series of six decisions.
Using a Savage matrix representation of lotteries, their subjects chose between safe lottery
($𝑐, 0.89; $8, 0.10; $8, 0.01)

and

risky

lottery

($𝑐, 0.89; $10, 0.10; $0, 0.01)

for

𝑐∈

{0,5,8,10,16,20}. Let R denote a ‘risky’ choice and S denote a ‘safe’ choice. Ordering the six
choices from those with the lowest value of 𝑐 to the highest value of 𝑐, only the preference patterns
RRRRRR and SSSSSS are consistent with EU. The classic Allais paradox corresponds to the case
where the first letter in the sequence is R (where 𝑐 = 0) and the third letter is S (where 𝑐 = 8).
Models which assign different weights to certain and uncertain outcomes predict a ‘certainty
effect’ pattern of RRSRRR but not the ‘zero effect’ pattern RSSSSS. In contrast, QRD is consistent
with a ‘zero effect’ pattern RSSSSS, but not with a certainty effect pattern. The standard RDU
model permits the zero effect pattern, the certainty effect pattern, and the reverse of each pattern,
and so is not very helpful in predicting which effect will dominate. In fact, Incekara-Hafalir and
Stecher (2016) observed strong support for the zero effect pattern while none of the subjects in
their experiment exhibited the certainty effect pattern2. Both of these findings are consistent with
security bias as formalized by QRD. It thus appears that (2) may actually be the more appropriate

2

Incekara-Hafalir and Stecher also find that the effect of security level is strongest when the minimum payoff is zero.
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analog to (3). Such a conclusion is encouraging because (2) satisfies both stochastic dominance
and transitivity. Furthermore, as we will illustrate in the following sections, (2) can be plugged
into economic models involving risk as simply as quasi-hyperbolic discounting can be plugged
into economic models involving time.

III.

BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS

We next explore four behavioral implications of QRD: continuity violations, loss aversion, the
Allais paradox and the common ratio effect.
A. Violations of Continuity
The continuity axiom of EU implies that for any lotteries 𝑝, 𝑝′ , 𝑝′′ such that 𝑝 ≿ 𝑝′ ≿ 𝑝′′ , there
exists probability 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] such that 𝛼𝑝 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝′′ ~ 𝑝′. Although continuity is a standard
assumption, there are intuitive cases where it can be violated. Adapting an example from Levin
(2006), suppose 𝑝 ≔ (𝑤 + $10, 1), (i.e., 𝑝 yields your current wealth 𝑤 plus $10 with certainty),
𝑝′ ≔ (𝑤, 1) (i.e., the status quo), and 𝑝′′ ≔ (0,1) (you lose all your wealth with certainty). Would
most people really be willing to risk losing all their wealth for a chance of gaining $10? Does
rationality really require such behavior? We show that QRD can explain violations of continuity
in such cases. In this example, under QRD, continuity requires there to be some 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] so that
𝑉(𝛼𝑝 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝′′ ) = 𝜃𝛼(𝑢(𝑤 + 10) − 𝑢(0)) + 𝑢(0) = 𝑢(𝑤).
Clearly this equation need not hold when 𝜃 < 1. For instance, we can normalize utilities so that
𝑢(𝑤 + 10) = 1 and 𝑢(0) = 0. If 𝑢(𝑤) > 0.9, then any 𝜃 ≤ 0.9, implies 𝑝′ ≻ 𝛼𝑝 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝′′
for all 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] and the agent will not risk all his wealth for any 𝛼 ∈ [0,1]. Under QRD, continuity
is satisfied for lotteries with the same worst-case scenario which may be a more natural condition.
B. Loss Aversion
A fundamental property of observed choices under risk is loss aversion which has been defined
behaviorally by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Schmidt and Zank (2005) as aversion to 5050 gain-loss bets. More formally, given a choice between lotteries 𝑓 and 𝑔 where 𝑓 ≔
(𝑦, 0.5; −𝑦, 0.5) and 𝑔 ≔ (𝑥, 0.5; −𝑥, 0.5), for any 𝑥 > 𝑦 ≥ 0, loss aversion holds if 𝑓 ≻ 𝑔.
Proposition 1: Let 𝑢(−𝑥) = −𝑢(𝑥) for all 𝑥. Then loss aversion holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ [0,1).
C.

Rabin’s Paradox

Rabin (2000) introduced a powerful critique of EU. Rabin proved a calibration theorem which
implies, for instance, that an EU maximizer who rejects a 50-50 bet to lose $100 or win $125 at
8

all wealth levels will also reject a 50-50 bet to lose $600 or win $1 million. Rabin’s theorem is
often taken as strong evidence against the assumption of a utility function over final wealth levels
Under the QRD model, the 50-50 lose $100, gain $125 bet is rejected at all wealth levels, 𝑤 >
$100, if 𝑢(𝑤) > (1 − 𝜃/2)𝑢(𝑤 − 100) + (𝜃/2)𝑢(𝑤 + 125) for all 𝑤 > $100. Under the
assumption that 𝑢 is strictly concave, it follows that:
𝑢((1 − 𝜃/2)(𝑤 − 100) + (𝜃/2)(𝑤 + 125)) > (1 − 𝜃/2)𝑢(𝑤 − 100) + (𝜃/2)𝑢(𝑤 + 125)
for all 𝜃 ∈ (0,1). Also, note that for any 𝜃 ∈ (0, 8/9), we have:
𝑢(𝑤) > 𝑢((1 − 𝜃/2)(𝑤 − 100) + (𝜃/2)(𝑤 + 125)).
Thus, for any strictly concave utility function, a QRD agent with 𝜃 ∈ (0, 8/9) will always reject
Rabin’s small stakes gamble. Next consider the 50-50 gamble to lose $600 or gain $𝑧. The gamble
is accepted at current wealth level, 𝑤, if (𝜃/2)𝑢(𝑤 + 𝑧) + (1 − 𝜃/2)𝑢(𝑤 − 600) > 𝑢(𝑤).
In order for the gamble to be accepted, it must also be the case that:
𝑢(𝑤 + 𝑧(𝜃/2) − 600(1 − 𝜃/2)) > 𝑢(𝑤),
which implies 𝜃 > 1200/(600 + 𝑧). Under the preceding restrictions on 𝜃, a QRD agent may
reject the small stakes gamble at all wealth levels and choose the gamble with a 50-50 chance of
losing $600 or gaining $𝑧 for sufficiently large 𝑧. As concrete examples, fixing 𝜃 = 0.7, if 𝑢(𝑥) =
𝑥, the first gamble is always rejected and the second is accepted for all 𝑧 ≥ $1115; if 𝑢(𝑥) =
ln(𝑥), the first gamble is always rejected and the second is accepted. for all 𝑧 ≥ $1218.
D. The Common Ratio Effect
In the following analysis, we provide general conditions on 𝜃 which explain two systematic
deviations from EU – the common ratio effect and the Allais paradox. In both cases, we assume
that the decision maker has QRD preferences.
A robust violation of EU, the common ratio effect (at certainty), is defined next.
Definition 2: (Common Ratio Effect): Let 𝑓 ≔ (𝑦, 1), 𝑓 ′ ≔ (𝑦, 𝑞; 0,1 − 𝑞),
𝑔 ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝; 0,1 − 𝑝), 𝑔′ ≔ (𝑥, 𝑞𝑝; 0,1 − 𝑞𝑝), for any ∈ (0, 𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ (0,1). The common
ratio effect holds if 𝑓 ~ 𝑔 implies 𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′.
Proposition 2: The common ratio effect holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ (0,1)
In the classic version of the common ratio effect due to Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($4000, $3000, 0.8, 0.25). Definition 2 implies that an agent who is indifferent
between lotteries 𝑓 and 𝑔 will strictly prefer 𝑔′ over 𝑓′.
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E. The Allais Paradox
The Allais paradox (also known as the common consequence effect) is defined as:
Definition 3: (Allais Paradox): Let 𝑓 ≔ (𝑦, 1), 𝑓 ′ ≔ (𝑦, 𝑞; 0,1 − 𝑞),
𝑔 ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝; 𝑦, 1 − 𝑞; 0, 𝑞 − 𝑝), 𝑔′ ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝, 0; 1 − 𝑝), for any 𝑦 ∈ (0, 𝑥) and 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ (0,1).

The

Allais paradox holds if 𝑓 ~ 𝑔 implies 𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′.
Proposition 3: The Allais paradox holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
In the classic Allais paradox (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($5 Million, $1 Million, 0.10, 0.11). Definition 3
implies that an agent who is indifferent between lotteries 𝑓 and 𝑔 will strictly prefer 𝑔′ over 𝑓′.
F. Stake Dependence of the Allais Paradox
The QRD model also makes predictions regarding the Allais paradox which distinguish it from
the most widely used specification of CPT. While the Allais paradox is observed at the large stakes
of Allais (1953) where (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($5 Million, $1 Million, 0.10, 0.11), and at the stakes used
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($2500, $2400, 0.33, 0.34), the paradox
is greatly diminished at small stakes. In particular, when payoffs are scaled down to (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) =
($100, $20, 0.10, 0.11), as done by Fan (2002), or to (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) = ($25, $5, 0.10, 0.11), as done
by Huck and Muller (2012), experimental subjects typically choose the riskier lottery in both
choices. There is a strong intuitive basis for not observing the paradox at these small stakes: People
are naturally willing to accept the 1% chance of receiving $0 in exchange for a 10% chance of
receiving $100. The appeal of the sure-thing is not as strong at small stakes. It is only when the
large payoff is not much larger than the sure-thing (as in Kahneman and Tversky’s example), or
when the sure-thing is a very large amount (as in the Allais example), that the paradox is likely to
be observed. Thus, a more complete explanation of the Allais paradox should predict the paradox
to occur at the large stakes observed by Allais, and Kahneman and Tversky, but should predict
behavior consistent with EU at the smaller stakes used by Fan (2002) and Huck and Muller (2012).
The standard version of CPT with a power value function defined over gains and losses cannot
account for this aggregate pattern even given any rank-dependent probability weighting function.
However, QRD naturally accommodates all four cases. For example, if 𝑢(𝑤 + 𝑥) = ln(𝑤 + 𝑥),
for an agent with current wealth 𝑤, and 𝜃 = 0.9, then for any 𝑤 such that $5,000 ≤ 𝑤 ≤
$500,000, QRD predicts the Allais paradox to be observed for the examples by Allais (1953) and
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and predicts behavior consistent with EU (the choice of the two
riskier options) for the examples from Fan (2002) and Huck and Muller (2012).
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IV.

APPLICATION TO RISK REDUCTION AND INSURANCE PURCHASE

For decisions under risk, an important implication of quasi-rank dependent probability weighting
is that a decision maker will pay a disproportionately higher premium for risk elimination than for
an equivalent degree of risk reduction that does not eliminate the risk. This prediction also has
empirical support. For instance, Botzen et al. (2013) find that households place a substantial
premium on policies to eliminate flood risk relative to other opportunities which merely reduce
the risk. A similar conclusion was reached by Viscusi et al. (2014) who found there to be a greater
premium for policies that reduce cancer risks to zero relative to policies which reduce but do not
eliminate the risk. We illustrate this preference for risk elimination in the context of insurance.
A. The Decision to Purchase Regular Insurance
Consider the following situation described by Blavatskyy (2014): A decision maker has a risk
of losing 𝐷 dollars with probability 𝑞 ∈ (0,1). The decision maker has the option of purchasing
𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝐷] units of insurance, where one unit of insurance costs 𝑐 dollars, with 𝑐 ∈ (0,1), and pays
the decision maker one dollar if the loss occurs. We consider the optimality of purchasing regular
(full) insurance (i.e., the case where 𝑥 = 𝐷) under the quasi-rank dependent model.
As noted by Blavatskyy, under regular insurance, the decision maker loses exactly 𝑐𝐷 dollars
regardless of whether the loss occurs. If 𝑥 < 𝐷, the decision maker loses 𝑐𝑥 dollars with
probability 1 − 𝑞 and loses 𝐷 + 𝑥(𝑐 − 1) dollars with probability 𝑞. Under the quasi-rank
dependent model, the decision maker will purchase regular insurance if and only if the following
inequality holds for any 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝐷).
𝑢(−𝑐𝐷) > 𝜃(1 − 𝑞)𝑢(−𝑐𝑥) + (1 − 𝜃 + 𝜃𝑞)𝑢(−𝐷 − 𝑥(𝑐 − 1)).
The preceding inequality can be arranged as follows:
𝑢(−𝑐𝐷)−𝑢(−𝐷−𝑥(𝑐−1))
(𝐷−𝑥)(1−𝑐)

(1 − 𝑐) >

𝑢(−𝑐𝑥)−𝑢(−𝐷−𝑥(𝑐−1))
𝐷−𝑥

(1 − 𝑞)𝜃.

The fraction on the left-hand side of the inequality is the slope of the utility function between
points −𝑐𝐷 and −𝐷 − 𝑥(𝑐 − 1), and the fraction on the right-hand side is the slope of the utility
function between points −𝑐𝑥 and −𝐷 − 𝑥(𝑐 − 1). For any strictly concave utility function 𝑢, the
slope on the left hand side is always greater than the slope on the right hand of the inequality.
Therefore, regular insurance will be optimal to purchase when (1 − 𝑐)/(1 − 𝑞) ≥ 𝜃.
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Under EU, we have 𝜃 = 1, and regular insurance is optimal when 𝑞 ≥ 𝑐. This observation is the
well-known result that a risk-averse expected utility maximizer will never purchase regular
insurance at an actuarially unfair price. This implication cannot be reconciled under EU with the
large premiums many people are willing to pay to eliminate risk. Rearranging the above
expression, we have the following which holds for any concave utility function:
Proposition 4: A risk-averse consumer with QRD preferences will purchase regular insurance at
an actuarially unfair price 𝑐 > 𝑞 if (4) holds:
(4)

1 − (1 − 𝑞)𝜃 ≥ 𝑐.

Note that there is always some 𝜃 ∗ < 1 such that an agent will purchase regular insurance, even at
an actuarially unfair price for any 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃 ∗ .
The QRD model can also explain the finding from Sydnor (2010) that many people ‘over-insure’
for modest risks. Sydnor found that expected utility theory could not explain his observations from
real insurance purchases that customers with a 4 percent probability of a loss were willing to pay
$95 to lower the deductible from $1,000 to $500. Let 𝑝 denote the price of insurance with a $1000
deductible, and let 𝑤 denote the consumer’s initial wealth. For simplicity and to isolate the role of
security bias, let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥. Then a QRD consumer prefers to pay $95 to lower the deductible from
$1000 to $500 if the following inequality holds:
(1 − 0.96𝜃)(𝑤 − 𝑝 − 595) + 0.96(𝑤 − 𝑝 − 95)𝜃 > (1 − 0.96𝜃)(𝑤 − 𝑝 − 1000) + 0.96(𝑤 − 𝑝)𝜃 .

This inequality holds under QRD for all 𝜃 < 0.84375.
B. Aversion to Probabilistic Insurance
Expected utility theory also predicts that a risk-averse agent will prefer ‘probabilistic insurance’
to regular insurance. Under probabilistic insurance, the decision maker pays a fraction of the
insurance premium up front. If the loss occurs, there is a probability that the decision maker pays
the remainder of the premium to receive full coverage from the insurance firm, but otherwise the
insurance firm refunds the partial premium already paid by the decision maker and does not cover
the loss. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate that many people will not purchase
probabilistic insurance, even though expected utility theory (with a concave utility function)
implies that probabilistic insurance will be preferred to regular insurance.
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As in the example from Kahneman and Tversky (1979), suppose that at wealth 𝑤, a person is
indifferent between paying premium 𝑦 to insure against a probability 𝑞 of losing 𝑥, where 𝑥 >
𝑦 > 0. Then a risk-averse expected utility maximizer would be willing to pay a smaller premium
𝑟𝑦 to reduce the probability of losing 𝑥 from 𝑞 to (1 − 𝑟)𝑞 for 𝑟 ∈ (0,1). Kahneman and Tverksy
note that in expected utility theory, “if one is indifferent between (𝑤 − 𝑥, 𝑞; 𝑤, 1 − 𝑞) and (𝑤 −
𝑦), then one should prefer probabilistic insurance (𝑤 − 𝑥, (1 − 𝑟)𝑞; 𝑤 − 𝑦, 𝑟𝑞; 𝑤 − 𝑟𝑦, 1 − 𝑞)
over regular insurance (𝑤 − 𝑦).”
Without loss of generality, set 𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑥) = 0 and 𝑢(𝑤) = 1. Under the quasi-rank dependent
model, the indifference condition implies
𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑦) = 𝜃(1 − 𝑞).
Probabilistic insurance is preferred to regular insurance if
𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑦) < 𝜃𝑟𝑞𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑦) + 𝜃(1 − 𝑞)𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑟𝑦).
For any 𝜃 > 0, substituting the indifference condition, we have
(1 − 𝑞) < (1 − 𝑞)𝑟𝑞𝜃 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑟𝑦).
For 𝜃 = 1, the above inequality holds if and only if 𝑢 is concave, implying a preference for
probabilistic insurance over regular insurance under expected utility theory. In contrast, we see
that regular insurance is preferred to probabilistic insurance if 1 − 𝑟𝑞𝜃 > 𝑢(𝑤 − 𝑟𝑦), which can
hold for 𝜃 < 1. As the examples in this section illustrate, the quasi-rank dependent model can be
very tractable in applications and provides a clean comparison to the expected utility predictions.
V.

APPLICATION TO PREDICTION MARKETS

We consider a prediction market based on Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006). Assets are ArrowDebreu securities which pay $1 if a target event occurs and $0 otherwise. There are 𝑚 traders, 𝑗 =
1, … . , 𝑚, of whom 𝑛 < 𝑚 are buyers and 𝑚 − 𝑛 are sellers. There is heterogeneity in beliefs,
where trader 𝑗 believes the target event will occur with probability 𝑞𝑗 . Wealth, 𝑤, is assumed to
be independent of beliefs. Beliefs are drawn from a distribution 𝐹(𝑞). Traders are price-takers and
pursue trading strategies which maximize their preferences. We assume that preferences are given
by the quasi-rank dependent utility model. Traders are risk-averse with log utility and have the
same degree of bias given by 𝜃. Wealth is only affected by the outcome of the prediction market
so there are no hedging motives for trading the security. Let 𝑝 denote the price of the security and
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let 𝑥𝑗 denote the quantity of the security purchased by trader 𝑗, for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛. Let 𝑦𝑗 denote the
quantity of the security sold by trader 𝑗, for 𝑗 = 𝑛 + 1, … 𝑚. Buyers of the security solve (5):
(5)

max 𝑉𝑗 = 𝜃𝑞𝑗 ln( 𝑤 + 𝑥𝑗 (1 − 𝑝)) + (1 − 𝜃𝑞𝑗 )ln(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑗 𝑝)
𝑥

for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛. Sellers of the security solve a similar maximization problem:
(6)

max 𝑉𝑗 = (1 − 𝜃 + 𝜃𝑞𝑗 )ln( 𝑤 − 𝑦𝑗 (1 − 𝑝)) + 𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑗 )ln(𝑤 + 𝑦𝑗 𝑝)
𝑦

for 𝑗 = 𝑛 + 1, … , 𝑚. The optimal quantity, 𝑥𝑗∗ , demanded by buyer 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 and the optimal
quantity, 𝑦𝑗∗ , offered by seller 𝑗 = 𝑛 + 1, … , 𝑚 are given by:
𝜃𝑞𝑗 −𝑝

𝑥𝑗∗ = 𝑤 𝑝(1−𝑝) ,

(7)

𝑦𝑗∗ = 𝑤

𝜃(1−𝑞𝑗 )−(1−𝑝)
𝑝(1−𝑝)

.

From the formulas for 𝑥𝑗∗ and 𝑦𝑗∗ , a buyer j’s demand is positive if 𝜃𝑞𝑗 − 𝑝 > 0 and seller j’s supply
is positive if 𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑗 ) − (1 − 𝑝) > 0. In equilibrium, supply equals demand, which implies:
𝑝 1

1+ −
𝜃(1−𝑞)−(1−𝑝)
∫−∞𝜃 𝜃 𝑤 𝑝(1−𝑝) 𝑓(𝑞)𝑑𝑞

(8)

∞

𝜃𝑞−𝑝

= ∫𝑝 𝑤 𝑝(1−𝑝) 𝑓(𝑞)𝑑𝑞
𝜃

From (7), we see that security bias implies that buying-selling price gaps will exist in equilibrium.
A similar finding was derived by Dow and Werlang (1992) in the context of portfolio choice3:
Proposition 5: Buying-selling price gaps exist in equilibrium: For QRD preferences, a trader with
belief 𝑞 will buy if and only if 𝑝 < 𝜃𝑞 and will sell if and only if 𝑝 > 𝜃𝑞 + 1 − 𝜃.
Note that when 𝜃 = 1 (i.e., under EU preferences), there are no buying-selling price gaps: A trader
with belief 𝑞 will buy the security when 𝑝 < 𝑞 and will sell when 𝑝 > 𝑞. Also note that the size
of the buying-selling price gap is equal to the degree of security bias (1 − 𝜃). For 𝜃 < 1, security
bias results in an efficiency loss: A buyer with belief 𝑞, could earn a positive subjective expected
payoff by trading for all 𝑞 ∈ (𝑝, 𝑝/𝜃) and a seller with belief 𝑞 could earn a positive subjective
𝑝

1

expected payoff by trading for all 𝑞 ∈ (1 + 𝜃 − 𝜃 , 𝑝). Yet no trade takes place for agents with 𝑞 ∈
𝑝

1 𝑝

𝜃

𝜃 𝜃

(1 + − , ). In an extreme case, if security bias is sufficiently strong, it can even lead to market
failure. For instance, if 𝑝 = 0.5 and 𝜃 = 0.5, then no trade occurs for any beliefs 𝑞 ∈ (0,1), even
though welfare enhancing trade could occur for all buyers with 𝑞 > 𝑝 and all sellers with 𝑞 < 𝑝.
4 5

For a less extreme example, if 𝑝 = 0.5 and 𝜃 = 0.9, then no trade occurs for beliefs 𝑞 ∈ (9 , 9).
3

Dow and Werlang (1992) demonstrated that buying-selling price gaps for assets in financial markets hold under the
more general Choquet Expected Utility preferences. The model of Bordalo et al. (2012a) generates buying-selling
price gaps in the context of salience-based consumer choice.
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∞

Next, we consider the impact of security bias on market prices. Let 𝑞 = ∫−∞ 𝑞𝑓(𝑞)𝑑𝑞 (i.e., the
average belief across the entire population of traders).
Definition 4: The equilibrium market price, 𝑝, is unbiased if 𝑝 = 𝑞.
Gjerstad (2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that in the EU case (i.e., 𝜃 = 1), market
prices will be unbiased. A natural question is whether prices can be unbiased despite the systematic
security bias of market participants (i.e., for 𝜃 < 1). That is, do equilibrium prices necessarily
depend on 𝜃 if traders have preferences that depend on 𝜃? We offer a simple illustration.
Proposition 6: Suppose buyers and sellers maximize (5) and (6), respectively, and that supply and
demand are each positive. If beliefs are uniformly distributed on [0,1], then equilibrium market
level prices will be unbiased (i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑞) for any systematic individual level bias 𝜃 ∈ (0.5,1].
Proof: The restriction 𝜃 ∈ (0.5,1] is necessary for supply and demand to each be positive4. Given
our assumption that wealth is independent of beliefs, if 𝑓(𝑞) is uniform on [0,1], and supply and
demand are positive, then (8) becomes:
𝑤

𝑝 1
𝜃 𝜃

1+ −

∫
𝑝(1−𝑝) 0

𝑤

1

(𝜃(1 − 𝑞) − (1 − 𝑝))𝑑𝑞 = 𝑝(1−𝑝) ∫𝑝 (𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝) 𝑑𝑞.
𝜃

The equilibrium price is then the price 𝑝 that solves (𝑝 + 𝜃 − 1)2 = (𝑝 − 𝜃)2 , yielding:
𝑝=

1 − 2𝜃 1
= = 𝑞. ∎
2 − 4𝜃 2

Although simple, Proposition 6 is a surprising result – aggregating preferences of systematically
biased agents produces unbiased market level prices!
A primary finding in behavioral economics is that biases are systematic. Thus, they will not
cancel out as noise in ways that random errors might. In contrast, many economists argue that
biases will be eliminated by the market. In his book, Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral
Economics, Thaler (2015) writes: “I call this argument the invisible handwave…The vague
argument is that markets somehow discipline people who are misbehaving. Handwaving is a must
because there is no logical way to arrive at a conclusion that markets transform people into rational
agents.” Interestingly, Proposition 6 considers the case where biases are systematic in the same
direction (in a manner consistent with the Allais paradox, and loss aversion) and shows that even

4

Given that beliefs are uniformly distributed over [0,1], the restriction that supply and demand are positive implies
𝑝
1 𝑝
that [1 + − , ] ⊂ [0,1] or, equivalently, that 1 − 𝜃 < 𝑝 < 𝜃.
𝜃

𝜃 𝜃
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if all agents in a market are systematically biased, equilibrium prices can accurately aggregate
beliefs and produce the same prices as-if all agents maximized expected utility.
Proposition 6 does not mean that biases do not affect market prices in general. The result is
restrictive, particularly given the uniform assumption for beliefs and the assumption that traders
have the same risk aversion and bias (although one might view this as a representative agent).
A subtle point related to Proposition 6 is that traders may revise their prior beliefs given the
information revealed by market prices to form posterior beliefs. We have implicitly assumed that
traders have fixed beliefs (i.e., their prior and posterior probabilities are equal). We next provide a
simple and plausible illustration that equilibrium prices can be the same for prior and posterior
beliefs, even if traders update their prior beliefs based on the information they extract from
observing market prices. To distinguish prior and posterior beliefs, we now denote the former by
𝑞 and the latter by 𝑞(𝑝). Consider a simple and plausible belief-updating rule discussed in Manski
(2006) in which a trader’s posterior belief is determined by a weighted average of her prior belief
and the observed market price. That is:
𝑞(𝑝) ≔ 𝜆𝑞 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑝.

(9)

where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. Under this rule, prior beliefs are updated in the direction of the market price, with
(1 − 𝜆) determining the degree to which beliefs are revised, including as special cases no revision
((1 − 𝜆) = 0) and full revision ((1 − 𝜆) = 1). If prior beliefs are uniformly distributed over [0,1],
then the distribution of posterior beliefs is uniform over the interval [(1 − 𝜆)𝑝, 𝜆 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑝]
which is a subset of [0,1]. This interval encompasses many possible supports for the uniform
distribution of posterior beliefs including those not centered at 0.5. Performing the same analysis
as in Proposition 6, assuming supply and demand are positive and setting supply equal to demand
in equilibrium yields:
𝑝(1−𝜃(1−𝜆))−(1−𝜃)
𝜃𝜆

∫
(1−𝜆)𝑝

𝜆+(1−𝜆)𝑝

(𝜃(1 − 𝜆𝑞 − (1 − 𝜆)𝑝) − (1 − 𝑝))
𝑑𝑞 =
𝜆

∫
𝑝(1−𝜃(1−𝜆))
𝜃𝜆

(𝜃(𝜆𝑞 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑝) − 𝑝)
𝑑𝑞.
𝜆

The equilibrium price is then the price 𝑝 that solves the following equation:
(𝑝((𝜆2 − 1)𝜃 + 1) + (𝜃 − 1))2 = (𝑝((𝜆2 − 1)𝜃 + 1) − 𝜆2 𝜃)2 .
Solving for 𝑝 yields:
𝑝=

1 − 2𝜃 − 𝜆4 𝜃 2 + 𝜃 2
1 2(1 − 𝜆)𝑝 + 𝜆
= =
= 𝑞. ∎
4
2
2
2(1 − 2𝜃 − 𝜆 𝜃 + 𝜃 ) 2
2
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Thus, even if agents use an updating rule that takes a weighted average of their prior and the market
price to form their posterior beliefs, the equilibrium price is the same as in Proposition 6.
VI.

APPLICATION TO EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING AND REVENUE EQUIVALENCE

The QRD model provides a simple tool for investigating whether and how economic conclusions
depend on the expected utility assumption. To further illustrate, consider an application to
auctions: There are 𝑛 bidders in a first price sealed bid private value auction for a single
deterministic object. Bidder valuations are independently drawn from a uniform distribution over
[0,1]. Bidders are QRD agents with linear utility and bias parameter 𝜃 ∈ (0,1]. Then there is a
𝑛−1

symmetric equilibrium in which a bidder with value 𝑣 bids 𝑏(𝑣) = (

𝑛

) 𝑣. This bidding strategy

is well known although it has only been proven for the case 𝜃 = 1 (i.e., where all bidders satisfy
EU). Here we observe that the result holds more generally for any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1]. To see this, suppose
bidder 𝐵1 has value 𝑣1 and bids 𝑏1 . Since 𝐵1 always wins the auction if 𝑏1 = (𝑛 − 1)/𝑛, we can
restrict our analysis to bids over the interval [0, (𝑛 − 1)/𝑛]. We need to establish that the strategy,
𝑏(𝑣), above, is a best response for 𝐵1 if it is adopted by all other bidders. Suppose another bidder
𝐵2 with value 𝑣2 bids 𝑏2 (𝑣2 ) = [(𝑛 − 1)/𝑛]𝑣2 < 𝑏1 . Since 𝑣2 is uniformly distributed over [0,1],
𝐵1 bids higher than 𝐵2 with probability 𝑛𝑏1 /(𝑛 − 1). To win, 𝐵1 must outbid all other bidders.
The probability 𝐵1 wins is:
𝑛 𝑛−1
) .
𝑛−1

𝑞(𝑏1 ) = 𝑏1𝑛−1 (
A QRD agent values each bid according to:

𝑉(𝑏1 ) = 𝜃𝑞(𝑏1 )(𝑣1 − 𝑏1 ) + (1 − 𝜃𝑞(𝑏1 ))(0).
When finding the bid that maximizes 𝑉(𝑏1 ), 𝜃 cancels and we obtain the same bid function 𝑏(𝑣)
noted above which is well known for the expected utility case. But now the result is more general,
holding for any degree of bias 𝜃 ∈ (0,1]. Also 𝜃 does not affect bidding behavior in a second price
sealed bid private value auction for a deterministic object5. It is then immediate that revenue
equivalence for the first and second price auctions, originally established for risk-neutral EU
agents, continues to hold for QRD agents with linear utility. Note that this conclusion holds for
any probability 𝑞(𝑏1 ) and so is robust to assuming a uniform value distribution.
Karni and Safra (1989) have demonstrated that when the object up for auction is a lottery, bidding one’s value in a
second price auction is only an equilibrium if the bidders are expected utility maximizers.
5
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VII.

EXTENSION TO OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

In the preceding analysis, we have considered the implications of a QRD agent in several
different economic environments. One might also be interested in the behavior of an agent who
exhibits both optimism and pessimism. The QRD model can be extended to the full NEO-EU
model of Chateauneuf et al. (2007) by allowing for the possibility that an agent is sensitive to both
the best and worst outcome of a lottery. For a lottery 𝑓, the NEO-EU model can be written as:
𝑉(𝑓) = 𝜃𝑈(𝑓) + (1 − 𝜃)[𝛼𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(𝑥)]

(10)

where 𝑈(𝑓) is the expected utility of 𝑓, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1] represents the agent’s degree of optimism, and
𝑥 and 𝑥 are, respectively, the most and least preferred outcomes in the support of 𝑓. Let
𝑎 ≔ (1 − 𝜃)𝛼 and let 𝑏 ≔ (1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝛼). The equivalent QRD representation to (10) is (11):
𝑎 + 𝜃𝑓(𝑥),
𝜃𝑓(𝑥),
𝑉(𝑓) = ∑𝑥∈𝑋 𝜋(𝑓(𝑥)) ∙ 𝑢(𝑥), where 𝜋(𝑓(𝑥)) = {
𝑏 + 𝜃𝑓(𝑥),

(11)

𝑥=𝑥
𝑥 ∈ (𝑥, 𝑥)
𝑥=𝑥

Note that (11) is ‘quasi-rank dependent’ in that it transforms individual rather than cumulative
probabilities and rank matters only for the best and worst outcomes. The model in (11) also
satisfies transitivity and stochastic dominance.
The results from Section V on prediction markets extend to the general QRD preferences in (10).
Buyers of the security now solve the following problem:
(12)

max 𝑉𝑗 = ((1 − 𝜃)𝛼 + 𝜃𝑞𝑗 )ln( 𝑤 + 𝑥𝑗 (1 − 𝑝)) + ((1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝛼) + 𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑗 ))ln(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑗 𝑝)
𝑥

for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛. Sellers of the security solve a similar maximization problem:
(13)

max 𝑉𝑗 = ((1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝛼) + 𝜃𝑞𝑗 )ln( 𝑤 − 𝑦𝑗 (1 − 𝑝)) + ((1 − 𝜃)𝛼 + 𝜃(1 − 𝑞𝑗 ))ln(𝑤 + 𝑦𝑗 𝑝)
𝑦

for 𝑗 = 𝑛 + 1, … 𝑚. The optimal quantity, 𝑥𝑗∗ , demanded by buyer 𝑗 = 1, … 𝑛 and the optimal
quantity, 𝑦𝑗∗ , offered by seller 𝑗 = 𝑛 + 1, … . 𝑚 are now given by:
𝑥𝑗∗ = 𝑤

𝜃𝑞𝑗 −𝑝+𝛼(1−𝜃)
𝑝(1−𝑝)

,

𝑦𝑗∗ = 𝑤

𝜃(1−𝑞𝑗 )−(1−𝑝)+𝛼(1−𝜃)
𝑝(1−𝑝)

.

In equilibrium, supply equals demand, which implies
(14)

𝑝 1 𝛼
𝜃 𝜃

1+ − + −𝛼

∫−∞𝜃

𝑤

𝜃(1−𝑞)−(1−𝑝)+𝛼(1−𝜃)
𝑝(1−𝑝)

∞

𝑓(𝑞)𝑑𝑞 = ∫𝑝−(𝛼(1−𝜃)) 𝑤
𝜃

𝜃𝑞−𝑝+𝛼(1−𝜃)
𝑝(1−𝑝)

𝑓(𝑞)𝑑𝑞

Next, we have the following generalization of Proposition 6:
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Proposition 7: Suppose buyers and sellers maximize (12) and (13), respectively, and that supply
and demand are each positive. If beliefs are uniform on [0,1], then equilibrium market prices will
be unbiased (i.e., 𝑝 = 𝑞) for any 𝜃 ∈ (0.5,1], and any degree of optimism or pessimism, 𝛼 ∈ [0,1].
Proof: Proceeding as in Section V, computing the optimal solutions to (12) and (13), and setting
demand equal to supply in equilibrium yields (14) for equilibrium prices. If beliefs are uniform on
[0,1], then solving (14) for 𝑝 yields:
𝑝=

1 − 2𝛼 − 2𝜃 + 2𝛼𝜃
= 0.5 = 𝑞. ∎
2(1 − 2𝛼 − 2𝜃 + 2𝛼𝜃)

Thus, even if we allow for any 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], distorting probabilities in the direction of optimism or
pessimism does not affect market prices when the distribution of beliefs is uniform.
VIII. APPLICATION TO FINANCE
We next apply the model to the domain of finance. Chateauneuf et al. (2007) considered a stylized
setting with one risky asset and one risk-free asset and demonstrated that model (10) could help
explain the equity premium puzzle. Here we generalize their approach to an arbitrary number of
risky assets and consider the implications of the model for some classical asset pricing anomalies.
We consider a representative agent economy with a representative investor who has initial wealth
𝑤0 and can invest in J > 1 risky assets and a riskless asset (bond). Asset j trades at price 𝑝𝑗 and
pays dividend 𝑥𝑗𝑠 if state 𝑠 occurs. There are S possible states of nature. The bond has a normalized
price of 1 and pays return 𝑟 in every state. The investor has subjective prior 𝜋 over states in which
state 𝑠 ∈ {1, … , 𝑆} occurs with probability 𝜋𝑠 > 0. The investor has preferences from (10, 11) with
temporal discount factor 𝛿 and chooses a portfolio (holdings of assets) to maximize (15):
(15)

max 𝑢(𝑐0 ) + 𝛿 (𝔼𝜋 [𝑢(𝑐𝑠 )]𝜃 + [𝛼 max 𝑢(𝑐𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼) min 𝑢(𝑐𝑠 )] (1 − 𝜃))
{𝜆𝑗 }

𝑠∈𝑆

𝑠∈𝑆

subject to the constraints: 𝑐0 = 𝑤0 − ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑝𝑗 , 𝑐𝑠 = 𝑤1 + ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 , 𝜆𝑗 ≥ 0, where 𝜆𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽
is the investor’s holding of asset 𝑗 (short sales are not permitted), and 𝑤1 is a deterministic
component of the investor’s wealth in Period 1. Substituting the constraints into the objective
function, (15) becomes (16) where the 𝜇𝑗 values are Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) multipliers:
(16)

max 𝑢(𝑤0 − ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑝𝑗 ) + 𝛿𝔼𝜋 [𝑢(𝑤1 + ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 )]𝜃
{𝜆𝑗 }

+ 𝛿 [𝛼 max 𝑢(𝑤1 + ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼) min 𝑢(𝑤1 + ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 )] (1 − 𝜃)} − ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝜇𝑗 .
𝑠∈𝑆

𝑠∈𝑆
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A difficulty in extending the model beyond the case of one risky asset is that when maximizing
(16), the partial derivatives of the max and min functions will not generally exist everywhere. To
address this issue and for illustration purposes, we make the following simplifying assumption:
We let all assets have the same (unique) worst state and the same (unique) best state. This amounts
to an assumption that asset returns are highly correlated in the best and worst market conditions,
consistent with the notion that economies transition through good times and bad times that affect
the entire market. Note that this assumption places no restriction on the relationship between asset
returns in intermediate states, nor does it restrict the relationship between returns of different assets
in the best and worst states.
Denote the state with the best and worst returns by 𝑠 and 𝑠, respectively. The assumption
that all assets have their best returns in the same state and their worst returns in the same state is a
strong assumption. There is, however, some surprising empirical support for this assumption, at
least as an approximation. For instance, Kim et al. (2015) present the data in Figure 1, which
depicts the average correlation across the daily returns of the Thomson Reuters Datastream Global
Equity Indices (Industry Classification Benchmark, Level 2) which spans 10 different industries,
conditioned on the market returns from 1973 to 2010. Kim et al. note, “The most distinctive feature
is that the average correlations during the extreme downside and the extreme upside are
considerably higher than the correlations under the normal market states. The principal implication
is that while industry index prices move relatively independently during normal market states, they
go down (up) simultaneously during extremely bad (good) times. (p.21)”.

Figure 1. Average correlation across industries from 1973 to 2010 conditioned on market returns.
(Reproduced from Kim et al., 2015)
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Let 𝑢(𝑐) and 𝑢(𝑐) denote the maximum utility and minimum utility across all states in Period 1,
and let 𝑥𝑗𝑠 and 𝑥𝑗𝑠 likewise denote the maximum and minimum randomized payoffs across states.
Under our correlation assumption, and given 𝜆𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑗 with at least one strict inequality,
we have ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 > ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 > ∑𝑗 𝜆𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑠 for all 𝑠 ≠ 𝑠, 𝑠. Setting the derivative with respect to each
𝜆𝑗 equal to zero yields the first order conditions:
−𝑝𝑗 𝑢′ (𝑐0 ) + 𝛿 (𝔼𝜋 [𝑢′ (𝑐𝑠 )𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]𝜃 + [𝛼𝑢′ (𝑐)𝑥𝑗𝑠 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢′ (𝑐)𝑥𝑗𝑠 ](1 − 𝜃)) − 𝜇𝑗 = 0 for all j.
The KKT conditions require 𝜇𝑗 𝜆𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑗. Consider the case where the representative investor
holds the market portfolio (consisting of all securities in the market). Then 𝜆𝑗 > 0 for all 𝑗, and
thus 𝜇𝑗 = 0 for all securities. Thus, the market portfolio is a local optimum. However, we are only
assured that the solution is a global maximum when the objective function is concave (i.e., when
𝛼 = 0). Nevertheless, as the KKT conditions are necessary for a global maximum, the equilibrium
price of any asset 𝑗 can be solved for directly in the general case, yielding (17):
(17)

𝑝𝑗 = 𝛿 (𝔼𝜋 [𝑢′(𝑐𝑠 )𝑥𝑠 ]𝜃 + [𝛼𝑢′(𝑐)𝑥𝑗𝑠 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢′(𝑐)𝑥𝑗𝑠 ](1 − 𝜃)) /𝑢′(𝑐0 ).

Next, define 𝛿𝑠 ≔ 𝛿𝑢′(𝑐𝑠 )/𝑢′(𝑐0 ). The quantity 𝛿𝑠 is the familiar ‘stochastic discount factor’
widely studied in asset pricing models. Also, define 𝛿𝑠 ≔ 𝛿𝑢′(𝑐)/𝑢′(𝑐0 ) and 𝛿𝑠 ≔ 𝛿𝑢′(𝑐)/𝑢′(𝑐0 ).
The pricing formula for asset 𝑗 can then be written:
(18)

𝑝𝑗 = 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]𝜃 + [𝛼(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 )](1 − 𝜃).

Using a covariance decomposition, we can write:
(19)

𝑝𝑗 = 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]𝜃 + cov(𝛿𝑠 , 𝑥𝑗𝑠 )𝜃 + [𝛼(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 )](1 − 𝜃).

In formula (19), the price of an asset depends on (i) the fundamental value of the asset
(discounted expected dividend); (ii) a risk premium; (iii) a positive skewness premium; (iv) an
ambiguity robustness premium; and (v) the investor’s degree of optimism, 𝛼. To see this, note that
we can rewrite (19) as (20):
(20)

𝑝𝑗 = 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ] + ℛ𝑗 + 𝛼𝒮𝑗 + (1 − 𝛼)ℳ𝑗
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ℛ𝑗 = [𝔼𝜋 [(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 )] − 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]]𝜃 = cov(𝛿𝑠 , 𝑥𝑗𝑠 )𝜃

𝒮𝑗 = [[(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 )] − 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]](1 − 𝜃)
ℳ𝑗 = [[(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 )] − 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]](1 − 𝜃)
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In (20), ℛ𝑗 is the risk premium, as in standard consumption-based asset pricing models which is
determined by the covariance of the returns on asset j with consumption. The quantity 𝒮𝑗 can be
interpreted as a positive skewness premium: For two assets with the same values of
𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ], 𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ], and 𝛿𝑠 , the asset with more positive skewness (in the sense of having a higher
maximum payoff) will be priced higher. The quantity ℳ𝑗 can be interpreted as a premium for
assets that are more robust to model uncertainty: For two assets with the same values of
𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ], 𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ], and 𝛿𝑠 , the asset which is more robust to ambiguity (in the sense of having a
higher minimum payoff) will be priced higher. Note that in (20), prices depend on both market
fundamentals (expected dividends) and ‘animal spirits’ (the market degree of optimism, 𝛼).
The equilibrium pricing formula for 𝑝𝑗 in (20) includes four important special cases: If the
investor has subjective expected utility preferences (𝜃 = 1), then 𝑟 = 1/𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ] and prices are:
(21)

𝑝̃𝑗𝑆𝐸𝑈 =

𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]
+ cov(𝛿𝑠 , 𝑥𝑗𝑠 ).
𝑟

If the investor has Hurwicz (1951) preferences (𝜃 = 0), based on the Hurwicz criterion for
robust decision making, then equilibrium prices do not depend on the investor’s beliefs and are:
(22)

𝑝̃𝑗𝐻𝑢𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑐𝑧 = 𝛼(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑥𝑗𝑠 ).

If the investor follows Wald’s (1950) maximin criterion for robust decisions under uncertainty
(𝜃 = 0, 𝛼 = 0), then equilibrium prices, (23), do not depend on the utility function or beliefs:
𝑥𝑗𝑠
(23)
𝑝̃𝑗𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 = .
𝑟
If the investor has linear utility, equilibrium prices from (20) reduce to (24):
(24)

𝑝̃𝑗 = (1/𝑟)(𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ] + (1 − 𝜃)[𝛼(𝑥𝑗𝑠 − 𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝑥𝑗𝑠 − 𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ])]).

Formula (24) was derived in a setting with a single asset by Chateauneuf et al. (2007). We have
derived the same formula as a special case of (20) for an arbitrary number of assets, and have
highlighted the correlation assumption that makes this derivation possible. In (24), the positive
skewness premium is (𝑥𝑗𝑠 − 𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]), and the ambiguity robustness premium is (𝑥𝑗𝑠 − 𝔼𝜋 [𝑥𝑗𝑠 ]).
Chateauneuf et al. (2007) noted that the equity premium under (24) when 𝛼 = 0 exceeds the
equity premium under SEU. They defined the equity premium as the ratio of the expected return
from the single risky asset in their economy to the price for that asset multiplied by the risk-free
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rate. However, they did not provide a calibration indicating whether the magnitude of the equity
premium is sufficient to account for the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Recently, Doeswijk et al. (2017) estimated the historical returns of what they termed the global
market portfolio (GMP) for over half a century (from 1960 through 2015). They found (Doeswijk
et al., Table 2) that the GMP had an average annual real return6 of 5.04%, a maximum annual real
return of 33.64%, and a minimum annual real return of -25.25%. During their observation period,
the real return on U.S. Treasury Bills was 1.13%. As a simple illustration, we apply the definition
of the equity premium from Chateauneuf et al. to the data on the GMP from Doeswijk et al. (2017),
using the support of real returns of the GMP from Doeswijk et al. as the support of real returns for
the market portfolio held by the representative investor. We can calculate the equity premium as
𝔼𝜋 [𝑟𝑚𝑠 ]/(𝑝̃𝑚 𝑟) where 𝔼𝜋 [𝑟𝑚𝑠 ] is the expected return on the GMP, 𝑝̃𝑚 is the price per share of the
GMP (from (24)) and 𝑟 is the risk-free rate. To illustrate, let 𝛿 = 1. Then if 𝜃 = 1, the equity
premium is 0% (since all agents are risk-neutral and maximize expected return). However, for 𝜃 =
0.8 and 𝛼 = 0, (QRD model (2)), the equity premium is 6.12%. This is close to the 6.18% equity
premium estimated by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and it obtains even when utility is linear. In
contrast, Mehra and Prescott find that for EU with a power utility function, even a risk aversion
coefficient of 10, far above typical empirical estimates, cannot produce an equity premium greater
than 0.35%, far below the 6.18% premium they observed. For 𝜃 = 0.75 and 𝛼 = 0, the equity
premium is 7.769%. If 𝛼 is small but positive (e.g., 𝛼 = 0.10), then for 𝜃 = 0.75, the equity
premium is 6.17%. Thus, security bias can rationalize the equity premium puzzle.
Returning to the general formula in (20), we now seek to derive a formula for the expected
return on asset 𝑗. Since returns satisfy 𝑟𝑗𝑠 = 𝑥𝑗𝑠 /𝑝𝑗 , they satisfy the relationship:
(25)

1 = 𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝔼𝜋 [𝑟𝑗𝑠 ]𝜃 + cov(𝛿𝑠 , 𝑟𝑗𝑠 )𝜃 + [𝛼(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑟𝑗𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑟𝑗𝑠 )](1 − 𝜃),

which is a special case of (19). For a risk-free asset (that pays the same return, 𝑟, in every state):
(26)

1 = 𝑟 (𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝜃 + [𝛼(𝛿𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝛿𝑠 )](1 − 𝜃)).

For linear utility and 𝛿 = 1, the equilibrium risk-free rate from (26) is given by 𝑟 = 1. Thus, QRD
can generate both a high equity premium and a low-risk free rate in equilibrium, a combination of
predictions that has proved to be challenging in models of consumption-based asset pricing.

6

We used the arithmetic average real return from Doeswijk et al. of 5.04%. Similar results (approximately 6% equity
premium) obtain with the same parameter values if one uses their reported compounded average real return of 4.38%.
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To derive a formula for expected returns, equating (25) and (26) and rearranging terms yields:
(27)

𝔼𝜋 [𝑟𝑗𝑠 ] − 𝑟 =

−cov(𝛿𝑠 , 𝑟𝑗𝑠 )𝜃 + [𝛼(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑟 − 𝑟𝑗𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝛼)(𝛿𝑠 )(𝑟 − 𝑟𝑗𝑠 )](1 − 𝜃)
.
𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ]𝜃

Next, define the following notation:
(28)

𝛽1,𝑗 ≔ (

𝛿𝑠 (𝑟𝑗𝑠 − 𝑟)
𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 (𝑟𝑗𝑠 − 𝔼𝜋 [𝑟𝑗𝑠 ])]
𝛿𝑠 (𝑟𝑗𝑠 − 𝑟)
) ; 𝛽2,𝑗 ≔ (
) ; 𝛽3,𝑗 ≔ (
).
var(𝛿𝑠 )
var(𝛿𝑠 )
var(𝛿𝑠 )

Also, let 𝐷(𝛿𝑠 ) ≔ var(𝛿𝑠 )/𝔼𝜋 [𝛿𝑠 ] denote the index of dispersion associated with the stochastic
discount factor. Then the relationship in (27) can be expressed as a beta asset pricing model:
Proposition 8: In a representative agent economy with equilibrium price (20), the equilibrium
expected return on any asset 𝑗 is given by (29) with 𝛽1,𝑗 , 𝛽2,𝑗 , and 𝛽3,𝑗 from (28):
(29)

𝔼𝜋 [𝑟𝑗𝑠 ] = 𝑟 − 𝛽1,𝑗 [𝐷(𝛿𝑠 )] − 𝛽2,𝑗 [𝛼(1 − 𝜃)𝐷(𝛿𝑠 )/𝜃] − 𝛽3,𝑗 [(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜃)𝐷(𝛿𝑠 )/𝜃].
cov(𝛿𝑠 ,𝑟𝑗𝑠 )

In (28), the risk factor 𝛽1,𝑗 can be written equivalently as 𝛽1,𝑗 = (

var(𝛿𝑠 )

) which is the same

as in the standard consumption-based asset pricing models. The interesting content of (29) is the
emergence of two new asset pricing factors that come out of our analysis: 𝛽2,𝑗 can be viewed as a
positive skewness factor that reduces the expected returns in equilibrium for assets with high
potential (high maximum payoff); 𝛽3,𝑗 can be viewed as an ambiguity robustness factor that
reduces the expected returns in equilibrium for assets that are more robust to model uncertainty (in
the sense of having a higher minimum payoff). As a result, value stocks and small-cap stocks will
tend to be underpriced in equilibrium since they are often thought to be vulnerable to bankruptcy
(low minimum payoff). As a consequence, they will earn higher expected returns in equilibrium,
consistent with the findings of Fama and French (1992). In contrast, growth stocks are viewed to
have great potential (high maximum payoff) and so, will be priced higher by the market and will
earn lower returns in equilibrium under (29). Thus, from (28, 29) in equilibrium, assets with greater
risk (positive covariance with consumption implying negative covariance with the stochastic
discount factor) earn a higher expected return, assets with greater positive skewness (higher
maximum return 𝑟𝑗𝑠 > 𝑟 and thus higher 𝛽2,𝑗 ) earn lower expected returns, and assets with greater
robustness to ambiguity (higher minimum return 𝑟𝑗𝑠 < 𝑟, and thus higher 𝛽3,𝑗 ) earn lower expected
returns. In this respect, positive skewness factor, 𝛽2,𝑗 , and ambiguity robustness factor, 𝛽3,𝑗 , that
emerge from our analysis may capture some of the information embedded in the Fama-French
(1992) factors.
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IX.

A THREE-FACTOR MODEL OF BEHAVIORAL BIASES

We have considered an intuitive analogy between quasi-rank dependent probability weighting
and quasi-hyperbolic time discounting. We now show that there is a plausible formal relation
between these models by extending QRD to incorporate both risk and time preferences. To do so,
we assume three payoffs are particularly salient when evaluating an uncertain consumption stream:
the worst possible outcome, the best possible outcome, and the ‘certain-immediate’ outcome – the
most the agent can be guaranteed in the present period. This is consistent with the intuition that a
person may focus on the worst-case scenario, the best-case scenario, and the ‘offer on the table’.
A. Extension to Choice over Time
Formally, let 𝑋 ⊂ ℝ denote a finite set of possible outcomes, and let 𝑇 = {0,1,2, … , T} denote
a finite set of discrete time periods. A consumption sequence 𝑥𝑗 ≔ {𝑥𝑗1 , … , 𝑥𝑗T } is a sequence of
dated outcomes. An outcome in 𝑋 received in period 𝑡 from a consumption sequence 𝑥𝑗 is denoted
𝑥𝑗𝑡 . We index consumption sequences by 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑛}. Denote the set of consumption sequences
by 𝐶. A stochastic consumption plan, 𝑓: 𝐶 → [0,1], is a probability distribution on 𝐶, where 𝑓(𝑥𝑗 )
is the probability that the decision maker receives consumption sequence 𝑗 if he chooses 𝑓. Denote
the set of stochastic consumption plans by Ω. The minimum outcome available from a stochastic
consumption plan 𝑓 in period 0 is denoted 𝑥0 and the maximum and minimum outcomes that can
be obtained from 𝑓 across all periods 𝑡 ∈ {0,1,2, … , T} are denoted by 𝑥 and 𝑥, respectively, where
we omit the dependence on 𝑓 for notational convenience. Let ≿ denote a weak preference relation
on Ω with ≻ and ~ denoting strict preference and indifference, respectively.
We propose that three payoffs are particularly salient to a decision maker when evaluating a
stochastic consumption plan, 𝑓: the best outcome, 𝑥, the worst outcome, 𝑥, and the ‘certainimmediate’ outcome, 𝑥0 , which combines two properties - certainty, and immediacy, and
represents the most the agent can be guaranteed in the present period from 𝑓. We account for these
payoffs by generalizing (2) and (10, 11) to encompass both risk and time preferences. In particular,
we consider a decision maker who evaluates stochastic consumption plans such that for any 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈
Ω, 𝑓 ≿ 𝑔 if and only if 𝑉(𝑓) ≥ 𝑉(𝑔), where:
(30)

𝑉(𝑓) = 𝜃 ∑𝑡 𝛿 𝑡 [𝑈(𝑓)] + (1 − 𝜃)[𝛼𝑢(𝑥) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑥0 ) + 𝛾𝑢(𝑥)]

where 𝑈(𝑓) = ∑𝑗 𝑓(𝑥𝑗𝑡 ) ∙ 𝑢(𝑥𝑗𝑡 ), and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃, 𝛿 ∈ [0,1].
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In (30), a decision maker exhibits a disproportionate preference for alternatives with higher
minimum payoffs, higher maximum payoffs, and higher immediate payoffs. In particular, the
decision maker maximizes a weighted average of discounted expected utility and ‘salient utility’
by overweighting the best, worst, and immediate outcomes.
Formula (30) provides a ‘three-factor model’ of behavioral biases, perhaps analogous in spirit
to the five-factor model of personality traits in psychology. The three factors, 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾, have
intuitive interpretations as indexing the decision maker’s degree of (positive) skewness preference,
present bias, and security bias, respectively. Security bias unifies a bias toward certainty in the
Allais paradoxes, loss aversion for mixed gambles, the sign effect for choice over time, and a
preference for robustness to ambiguity when probabilities are subjective. Skewness preference
produces systematic deviations from risk aversion for choices under risk and produces systematic
deviations from consumption smoothing for choices over time. When (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) = (0,1,0), model
(30) reduces to quasi-hyperbolic discounting for choices over time. When (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) = (0,0,1), (30)
reduces to QRD from (2) for choices under risk. By estimating 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾, one can determine the
relative strength of skewness preference, present bias, and security bias for a decision maker.
When 𝜃 = 0.5, the three-factor model in (30) can be equivalently written as:
(31)

𝑉(𝑓) = ∑𝑡 𝛿 𝑡 [𝑈(𝑓)] + 𝛼𝑢(𝑥) + 𝛽𝑢(𝑥0 ) + 𝛾𝑢(𝑥).

The three-factor model has the appealing feature that it is linear in behavioral biases and so
should be convenient when investigating the effects of particular biases on economic behavior.
If the consumer’s true preferences satisfy the axioms of rational choice (i.e., are consistent with
discounted expected utility theory), the parameter 𝜃 represents the degree to which the consumer
deviates from the optimal dynamic programming solution to his preference maximization problem
by systematically overweighting the best-case outcome, the worst-case outcome, and the certainimmediate outcome. Under this interpretation, the three-factor model provides a coherent and
general alternative to the neo-classical view of perfect optimizing behavior that applies to both risk
and time preferences and can also be applied to a setting with purely subjective probabilities. When
𝜃 = 1, the consumer perfectly optimizes. For lower values of 𝜃, the consumer increasingly focuses
on the salient payoffs and places less weight on maximizing discounted expected utility. In the
other extreme where 𝜃 = 0, the decision maker more closely resembles a ‘greedy algorithm’ that
seeks to obtain the most that can be guaranteed immediately and neglects all future consequences
and all uncertain outcomes except those yielding the best or worst payoff in the stochastic
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consumption plan. This interpretation suggests the testable prediction that when two alternatives
have the same best, worst, and immediate outcomes, behavior will conform more closely to
discounted expected utility theory.
To illustrate the three-factor model, we will adopt a simple specification of (30) where 𝛼 =
𝛽 = 𝛾 = 1. Note that this specification still gives greater weight to security bias than to skewness
preference since 𝑥0 = 𝑥 for decisions involving only risk. Fixing 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾 to be equal, the only
parameters in (30) are the agent’s discount factor, 𝛿, utility function, 𝑢, and bias parameter, 𝜃.
We will show that the three-factor model explains four parallels between risk and time
preferences: (i) Present bias (Laibson, 1997) and the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979); (ii) the finding that risk interacts with time preferences (Keren and Roelofsma, 1995) and
that time interacts with risk preferences (Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011);
(iii) the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and a bias toward
concentration (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013), and (iv) loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
and the sign effect (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991). We will illustrate the three-factor model using
the same simple specification. In addition to setting 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 𝛾 = 1, we let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and set the
agent’s annual discount factor at 𝛿 = 0.95. In our parametric specification, the classical examples
of behaviors (i), (ii), and (iii) each hold for all 𝜃 ∈ [0.00, 0.90]. In addition, given any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1),
a sufficient condition for both the sign effect and loss aversion is 𝛼 < 𝛾 (skewness preference is
weaker than security bias). We assume in all propositions to follow that the decision maker has
preferences given by the three-factor model in (30).
B. Present Bias and the Certainty Effect
Since Prelec and Lowenstein (1991), there has been an intuitive analogy between the certainty
effect and present bias. In Section III, we saw that QRD provides a simple account of the Allais
paradox and common ratio effect with a certain payoff. Next, we consider present bias. For all the
following analyses, we let preferences be given by the three-factor model (30). Let (𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡) denote
a stochastic consumption plan that pays 𝑥 > 0 with probability 𝑝 at time 𝑡 and pays 0 otherwise.
Definition 5: (Present Bias): Let 𝑓 ≔ (𝑦, 1,0), 𝑓 ′ ≔ (𝑦, 1, 𝑠), 𝑔 ≔ (𝑥, 1, 𝑡), 𝑔′ ≔ (𝑥, 1, 𝑡 + 𝑠),
for any 𝑦 ∈ (0, 𝑥), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ (0, ∞). Present bias holds if 𝑓 ~ 𝑔 implies 𝑓 ′ ≺ 𝑔′ .
Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑓) denote the discounted utility of 𝑓, and set the time horizon for the decision maker to
span periods in the interval [0, 𝑡 + 𝑠]. For all periods not specified by each consumption plan, the
plan yields a payoff of 0.
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Proposition 9: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝑈(𝑔). Then present bias holds for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
For the present bias example in Table 1, we have (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡, 𝑠) = (110, 100, 4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠, 26 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠).
Definition 5 implies an agent who is indifferent between A and B in Choice Set 5, will strictly
prefer B from Choice Set 6. Under our parametric specification (𝛼 = 𝛽 = 𝛾 = 1, 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and
an annual discount factor of 𝛿 = 0.95), the preference for A in Choice Set 5 and for B in Choice
Set 6 holds for all 𝜃 ∈ [0.00, 0.90].
C. Interaction Effects between Risk and Time Preferences
Systematic interaction effects have also been documented for risk and time preferences. Table
1 illustrates seven empirical phenomena of interest. We have already discussed the Allais paradox,
common ratio effect and present bias. The fourth phenomenon in Table 1 captures an interaction
between risk and time in which a delay is added to decisions under risk (Baucells and Heukamp
2010). Since adding the three-month delay shifts preference toward the riskier lottery, we say ‘time
affects choice under risk.’ The fifth phenomenon captures a different interaction effect in which
uncertainty is introduced into decisions over time (Keren and Roelofsma 1995). Since introducing
uncertainty shifts preference toward the delayed lottery, we say ‘risk affects choice over time.’
The sixth observation is that delaying all outcomes by the same amount reduces the common ratio
effect. The seventh finding is that making all outcomes uncertain reduces present bias.
Table 1. Choices between Options A and B involving Risk and Time
Observation

CS

Option A

vs.

Option B

Allais paradox
(Allais, 1953)

1
2

(1 M, for sure, now)
(1 M, 11%, now)

(1 M, 89%; 5 M, 10%, now)
(5 M, 10%, now)

Common ratio effect
(Baucells & Heukamp, 2010)

3

4

(9, for sure, now)
(9, 10%, now)

(12, 80%, now)
(12, 8%, now)

Present bias
(Keren & Roelofsma, 1995)

5
6

(100, for sure, now)
(100, for sure, 26 weeks)

(110, for sure, 4 weeks)
(110, for sure, 30 weeks)

Time affects choice under risk
(Baucells & Heukamp, 2010)

7
8

(9, for sure, now)
(9, for sure, 3 months)

(12, 80%, now)
(12, 80%, 3 months)

Risk affects choice over time
(Keren & Roelofsma, 1995)

9
10

(100, for sure, now)
(100, 50%, now)

(110, for sure, 4 weeks)
(110, 50%, 4 weeks)

Common ratio depends on delay
(Baucells & Heukamp, 2010)

11
12

(9, for sure, 3 months)
(9, 10%, 3 months)

(12, 80%, 3 months)
(12, 8%, 3 months)

Present bias depends on risk
(Keren & Roelofsma, 1995)

13
14

(100, 50%, now)
(100, 50%, 26 weeks)

(110, 50%, 4 weeks)
(110, 50%, 30 weeks)

Complementary probabilities correspond to payoffs of 0. Majority responses of experimental subjects are highlighted in bold.
“CS” denotes “Choice Set”.
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As shown in Table 1, systematic interaction effects involving risk and time have been observed
in which incorporating risk into intertemporal choices produces more patient behavior (Keren and
Roelofsma, 1995) and incorporating delays into risky choices reduces risk aversion (Baucells and
Heukamp, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Such behaviors cannot be explained by any models in
which probability weighting functions and time discount functions are multiplicatively separable.
This results in a descriptive limitation of the quasi-hyperbolic model. As Levine (2012, p. 95)
writes: “The only problem with the model is that it predicts that present bias should not depend on
whether or not the reward is uncertain. Unfortunately this is not the case.”
The problem is naturally resolved in the more general setting presented here. In addition to
predicting that present bias depends on whether the reward stream is uncertain, the three-factor
model also predicts that the common ratio effect depends on whether or not the lotteries are
delayed. Both of these predictions are supported experimentally. The first prediction concerns the
effect of delaying outcomes in decisions under risk, which systematically reduces risk aversion
(Baucells and Heukamp, 2010; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). We can formalize this effect as follows:
Definition 6: (Time affects Choice under Risk): Let 𝑓 ≔ (𝑦, 1,0), 𝑓 ′ ≔ (𝑦, 1, 𝑡), 𝑔 ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝, 0),
𝑔′ ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡), for any 𝑦 ∈ (0, 𝑥), 𝑝 ∈ (0,1), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 ∈ (0, ∞). Time reduces risk aversion if 𝑓 ~ 𝑔
implies 𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′.
Let 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑓) denote the discounted expected utility of 𝑓, and set the time horizon for the decision
maker to span periods in the interval [0, 𝑡]. For all periods not specified by each stochastic
consumption plan, the plan yields a payoff of 0.
Proposition 10: Let 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑔). Then time reduces risk aversion for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1)
In the experimental example in Table 1, (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑡) = (12, 9, 0.8, 3 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠). Definition 6
implies that an agent who is indifferent between A and B in Choice Set 7, will strictly prefer B
from Choice Set 8. Under our running parametric specification (𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and an annual discount
factor of 𝛿 = 0.95), the preference for A in Choice Set 7 and for B in Choice Set 8 holds for all
𝜃 ∈ [0.00, 0.90].
A second prediction of the three-factor model concerns how uncertainty affects choice over
time. In particular, we consider the finding by Keren and Roelofsma that introducing risk into
intertemporal decisions reduces impatience. This behavior can be defined as follows:
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Definition 7: (Risk affects Choice over Time): Let 𝑓 ≔ (𝑦, 1,0), 𝑓 ′ ≔ (𝑦, 𝑝, 0), 𝑔 ≔ (𝑥, 1, 𝑡),
𝑔′ ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝, 𝑡), for any 𝑦 ∈ (0, 𝑥), 𝑝 ∈ (0,1), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 ∈ (0, ∞). Risk reduces impatience if 𝑓 ~ 𝑔
implies 𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′.
Proposition 11: Let 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑔). Then risk reduces impatience for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
In the experimental example in Table 1 (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑡) = (110, 100, 0.5, 4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠). Definition 7
implies that an agent who is indifferent between A and B in Choice Set 9, will strictly prefer B
from Choice Set 10. Under our running parametric specification (𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and an annual discount
factor of 𝛿 = 0.95), the preference for A in Choice Set 9 and for B in Choice Set 10 holds for all
𝜃 ∈ [0.00, 0.90].
The predictions that time affects choice under risk and that risk affects choice over time are less
obvious than more familiar behaviors (certainty effect, present bias), but these interaction effects
between risk and time are supported by the empirical data, as illustrated in Table 1. Moreover, the
opposite preference patterns are not predicted, revealing these behaviors to be strong implications
of the three-factor model.
D. The Fourfold Risk Pattern and a Bias Toward Concentration
A robust property of observed risk preferences is the fourfold pattern observed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) and illustrated in Table 2. Under the fourfold pattern of risk preferences, a
decision maker is risk-averse for gains of high probability and losses of low probability, but is
risk-seeking for gains of low probability and losses of high probability. An example of the fourfold
pattern from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Choices illustrating the Fourfold Risk Pattern and a Bias Toward Concentration
Observation

CS

Option A

vs.

Option B

1

( 95, for sure)

( 100, 95%; 0, 5%)

Fourfold Risk Pattern

2

( -5, for sure)

(-100, 5%; 0, 95%)

(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)

3

(-95, for sure)

(-100, 95%; 0, 5%)

4

( 5, for sure)

( 100, 5%; 0, 95%)

5

(100, 0, 0, …, 0, 0, 0)

(0, 1, 1 ,… 1, 1, 1)

Bias Toward Concentration

6

( 0, 0, 0, …, 0, 0, 100)

(1, 1, 1, … 1, 1, 0)

(Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013)

7

(-100, 0, 0,…, 0, 0, 0)

(0, -1, -1,…, -1, -1, -1)

8

(

(-1,-1, -1,…, -1, -1, 0)

0, 0, 0,…, 0, 0, -100)

The prototypical response pattern is highlighted in bold. “CS” denotes “Choice Set”.
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In the example, a person chooses $95 with certainty over a 95% chance of $100 and a 5% chance
of $0 (risk aversion for high probability gains), and chooses a guaranteed $5 loss over a 5% chance
of losing $100 (risk aversion for low probability losses). However, the decision maker also prefers
a 95% chance of losing $100 over a guaranteed loss of $95 (risk seeking for loses of high
probability) and prefers a 5% chance of winning $100 over a $5 with certainty (risk seeking for
gains of low probability).
Under (30) with 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, the fourfold pattern illustrated in Table 2 holds for all 𝛼, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
Formally, for decisions involving only risk (and no time) we have the following definition:
Definition 8: When comparing lotteries 𝑓 ≔ (𝑥, 𝑝; 0,1 − 𝑝) and 𝐸(𝑓) ≔ (𝑥𝑝, 1), the fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes holds if 𝐸(𝑓) ≻ 𝑓 for sufficiently high 𝑝 and 𝑓 ≻ 𝐸(𝑓) for sufficiently
low 𝑝 when 𝑥 > 0, but 𝑓 ≻ 𝐸(𝑓) for sufficiently high 𝑝 and 𝐸(𝑓) ≻ 𝑓 for sufficiently low 𝑝 when
𝑥 < 0.
Proposition 12: Let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥. Then the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes holds for all 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈
(0,1).
A related pattern of behavior in intertemporal choice referred to as a ‘bias toward concentration’
was identified by Koszegi and Szeidl (2013). They recognized that people often prefer
consumption sequences with a few large advantages relative to consumption sequences with many
small advantages and prefer consumption sequences with many small disadvantages relative to
those with a few large disadvantages.
A ‘fourfold’ pattern of time preference due to a bias toward concentration is illustrated in the
bottom panel of Table 2. In each of choices 5 – 8, a consumer chooses between gains or losses
over a horizon of 100 periods. In Choice Set 5, a consumer prefers $100 in period 0 over a steady
stream of $1 payoffs in periods 1 through 100. This behavior is reminiscent of a preference for a
large lump-sum payment from winning a lottery instead of receiving an annuity. Indeed, people
often prefer lump-sum gains instead of annuities (e.g., Brown, Casey, and Mitchell, 2007). In
Choice Set 6, the consumer prefers $100 in period 100 over a stream of $1 payoffs in periods 0
through 99, thereby exhibiting future bias for delayed concentrated gains. This behavior is
consistent with goal-seeking behavior in which small short-term gains from leisure activities are
foregone when working to achieve a personal or career goal. In Choice Set 7, the consumer prefers
to make $1 payments in each of periods 1 through 100 than to pay $100 outright in period 0. This
behavior reflects a preference for financing and making regular installment payments, such as on
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a car or a mortgage or a consumer durable, rather than paying the full cost up front. In Choice Set
8, the consumer prefers to pay $1 in each of periods 0 through 99 than to pay $100 in period 100,
exhibiting future bias for delayed concentrated losses. This behavior is reminiscent of the decision
to invest a small cost to exercise regularly to avoid large health costs in the future. Whether a
consumer chooses to exercise may depend on whether the consumer adopts this ‘many period’
frame, or views each decision in isolation as a binary choice to exercise now or later.
The fourfold pattern of risk preferences and the bias toward concentration can each be described
more succinctly as a twofold pattern: For risk, the fourfold pattern is equivalent to a preference for
positively skewed probability distributions (producing a preference for state lottery tickets) and an
aversion to negatively skewed distributions (producing a preference to purchase insurance). For
time, the bias toward concentration is equivalent to a preference for positively skewed consumption
sequences (producing a preference for large lump-sum gains over dispersed small gains) and an
aversion to negatively skewed consumption sequences (producing a preference for small monthly
payments over a single large payment). More formally, we have the following:
Definition 9: Consider a choice between consumption sequences A≔ (𝑛𝑥, 0, … ,0) that yields
payoff 𝑛𝑥 in period 0 and pays 0 in periods 1 through 𝑛, and B≔ (0, 𝑥, … , 𝑥) that pays 0 in period
0 and yields payoff 𝑥 in each of periods 1 through 𝑛. Next, consider a choice between consumption
sequences A′ ≔ (0, … ,0, 𝑛𝑥) that yields payoff 𝑛𝑥 in period 𝑛 and pays 0 in periods 0 through
𝑛 − 1, and B′ ≔ (𝑥, … , 𝑥, 0) that pays 0 in period 𝑛 and yields 𝑥 in each of periods 0 through
𝑛 − 1. A bias toward concentration holds if, for sufficiently large 𝑛, A ≻ B and A′ ≻ B′ for 𝑥 >
0, and B ≻ A and B′ ≻ A′ for 𝑥 < 0.
We analyze the undiscounted case which may be viewed as an approximation.
Proposition 13: Let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and 𝛿 = 1. Then a bias toward concentration holds for all
𝑛 > 1 + max(𝛽/𝛼, 𝛽/𝛾), for any 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
The quantity 𝛽/𝛼 in Proposition 13 reflects a tradeoff between the effect of present bias and a bias
toward concentration. Higher values of 𝛽 imply greater present bias while higher values of 𝛼 imply
greater concentration bias for gains. Similarly, higher values of 𝛾 imply greater concentration bias
for losses. The three-factor model thus provides an approach to unify present bias and
concentration bias.
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E. Loss Aversion and the Sign Effect
We close this section with a fourth striking parallel between risky and intertemporal choice –
the gain-loss asymmetry of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) for choice under risk,
and the gain-loss asymmetry referred to as the sign effect (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991) for
choices over time. For any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), a sufficient condition for loss aversion (aversion to
symmetric mixed gambles) under the three-factor model is 𝛼 < 𝛾 (skewness preference is weaker
than security bias). The sign effect for choice over time is the finding that people are more patient
for losses than for gains. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) define the sign effect as follows:
Definition 10: The sign effect holds if for all 𝑦 > 𝑥 > 0, 𝑡 > 𝑟 ≥ 0, (𝑥, 𝑟) ~ (𝑦, 𝑡) implies
(−𝑥, 𝑟) ≻ (−𝑦, 𝑡).
Proposition 14: Let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥. Then for any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), the sign effect holds if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛾.
In contrast, the sign effect cannot be explained by a conventional behavioral approach that
incorporates a loss aversion parameter into the value function of the decision maker. We
demonstrate this in the appendix after the proof of Proposition 14.
In sum, the parametric restrictions 𝛾 > 𝛼, and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) generate the certainty effect and
present bias, the fourfold pattern of risk preferences and a bias toward concentration, loss aversion
and the sign effect, and observed interaction effects between risk and time. Table 3 summarizes
the predictions of the three-factor model from (30) for these eight robust behaviors in the literature
on risk and time preferences for any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) and indicates the parameters driving each behavior.
Table 3. Predictions of the Three-Factor Model of Behavioral Biases
Risk

Time

Loss Aversion (𝛾)

Sign Effect (𝛾)

Time affects Risk Preference (𝛽)

Risk affects Time Preference (𝛽)

Certainty Effect (Allais, Common Ratio) (𝛾)

Present Bias, Time Inconsistency (𝛽)

Skewness Preference (Fourfold Pattern) (𝛼, 𝛾)

Skewness Preference (Bias toward Concentration) (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)

(𝛼 represents (positive) skewness preference; 𝛽 represents present bias; 𝛾 represents security bias)
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X. RELATED LITERATURE
The QRD model is a simple one-parameter generalization of expected utility theory. It preserves
three basic properties of expected utility analysis: transitivity, first-order stochastic dominance,
and risk aversion, while accounting for the Allais paradoxes, loss aversion, and intuitive violations
of continuity. Although the QRD model is simpler than leading models such as RDU and CPT, it
is quite similar to earlier models in the literature which assumed that decision makers care about a
‘security level’ (Lopes 1986; Gilboa 1988; Jaffray 1988; Cohen 1992). Schmidt (2000) appears to
be the first to explicitly state the form in (1), although it can be viewed as a special case in Gilboa
(1988). Kopylov (2009) axiomatizes an analogous model for ambiguity. Models which provide a
special role for the best and worst outcomes are characterized by Chateauneuf et al. (2007) for
ambiguity and by Webb and Zank (2011) for choice under risk. Despite its simplicity, the QRD
model has received little application, although Chateauneuf et al. (2007) apply their model to
simultaneous gambling and insurance purchase7 and to the equity premium puzzle.
It is peculiar that there is a large literature on non-expected utility models, but a relatively small
literature on importing such models into applications. A possible reason is that leading descriptive
models such as CPT are much less tractable than EU, whereas more tractable models of the
certainty effect (e.g., Schmidt 1998) violate transitivity or stochastic dominance. In this respect,
QRD may offer a compromise between descriptive adequacy and tractability8.
One alternative model of choice under risk that has gained popularity in applications is the
Koszegi-Rabin model of reference-dependent preferences (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; 2007). That
model can also explain loss aversion and the Allais paradox. The loss-aversion parameter, 𝜆, in
the Koszegi-Rabin model is consistent with rank dependent utility theory for 𝜆 < 2, but can violate
stochastic dominance if 𝜆 > 2. The model also makes the strong assumption that agents have
rational expectations regarding the reference point. In contrast, QRD does not violate stochastic
dominance and makes no assumptions regarding rational expectations. Under QRD there is a
natural reference point that is directly observable and well-specified for each lottery – the

7

Chateauneuf et al. consider the decision of whether to purchase insurance and lottery tickets, but do not consider the
optimality of purchasing full insurance.
8
Throughout we have considered our analysis apart from CPT. But note that QRD (both in (2) and in (11)) is in fact
a special case of rank-dependent utility theory, which itself is a special case of CPT for the domain of gains. Our
analysis however makes no direct use of cumulative probability weighting functions or reference-dependent value
functions, both of which are central components of CPT. However, given that QRD is technically a special case of
CPT, our analysis highlights a simple approach to making prospect theory tractable in economic applications.
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minimum outcome in the lottery’s support. In addition, QRD is naturally extended to a three-factor
model of behavioral biases that provides a formal relationship between three important principles
of behavior – present bias, security bias, and positive skewness preference. These three biases
interact to predict eight parallels between choices under risk and over time that violate the standard
discounted expected utility model (as summarized in Table 3).
The three factor model organizes a larger set of the leading anomalies than alternative models.
It also provides an alternative way to formalize loss aversion. Of course the three-factor model
does not explain all prominent behavioral anomalies. For instance, QRD does not generate the
‘lives-saved’/’lives-lost’ framing effect of Tversky and Kahneman (1981), whereas this can be
explained by prospect theory and salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012b). Under additional
assumptions, salience theory also can explain preference reversals between choice and pricing
tasks (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971).
In the domain of intertemporal choice, the hyperbolic discounting model of Loewenstein and
Prelec (1992) can explain present bias and the sign effect. The probability-time tradeoff model
(Baucells and Heukamp, 2012) can explain the risk-time interaction effects, the certainty effect
and present bias but does not explain other anomalies such as the sign effect or the bias toward
concentration. Interestingly, two models which have been imported to a variety of economic
applications – quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997) and the focusing model of Koszegi
and Szeidl (2013) each explain only one of the anomalies in Table 3. This demonstrates that datafitting is not the only important ingredient of a successful decision model. Mathematical
tractability is also important. Variations of the salience model of Bordalo et al. (2012b) have also
been widely applied, although that model has not been extended to choices over time. The threefactor model proposed here has the appealing property that it accounts for many of the leading
anomalies while being portable to economic applications. While it is true that model (30) has a
large number of parameters, simpler versions of the model are sufficient to generate the main
effects. For instance, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is a one-parameter extension of DU and the
quasi-rank dependent model of security bias is a one-parameter extension of EU, and both are
special cases of the three-factor model. In addition, we demonstrated that setting 𝛼 = 𝛽 = 𝛾 = 1
in (30) still generates seven of the behavioral anomalies in Table 3 even though this specification
has the same number of parameters as quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
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XI.

DISCUSSION

In this paper, we have motivated quasi-rank dependent (QRD) utility theory as a modeling tool for
studying security biased agents in economic applications. The QRD model satisfies transitivity,
stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, and is simpler than leading probability weighting models
since it transforms individual rather than cumulative probabilities. The QRD model has an intuitive
interpretation (i) as a pessimistic decision criterion that generalizes EU and Wald’s maximin rule,
and (ii) as a natural risky choice analog to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The model also provides
a unified explanation of the Allais paradox and loss aversion (aversion to small mixed gambles)
as well as expressing a preference for robustness to model uncertainty when probabilities are
subjective.
The QRD model was generalized in Section IX to a three-factor model of behavioral biases
(with factors of positive skewness preference, present bias, and security bias) that unifies quasihyperbolic time discounting and quasi-rank dependent probability weighting. The three-factor
model highlights three ways in which human decision making systematically deviates from
maximizing discounted expected utility: by exhibiting a disproportionate preference for
alternatives with higher minimum outcomes, higher maximum outcomes and higher immediate
outcomes. We demonstrated that the three-factor model explains eight prominent behavioral
anomalies and predicts close parallels between behaviors for decisions under risk and over time.
After describing the QRD model and the interpretations of security bias, we illustrated QRD
in several economic applications. In the domain of insurance, we showed that the QRD model can
explain the purchase of full insurance at actuarially unfair prices, which is not explained by EU.
For prediction and betting markets, we demonstrated, somewhat surprisingly, that it is possible for
a market to accurately aggregate traders’ beliefs and generate unbiased prices, even if all traders
are systematically biased. We also demonstrated that QRD predicts gaps between buying prices
and selling prices and that security bias can contribute to efficiency loss and market failure. With
the extended model in (10, 11), we generalized the analysis of Chateauneuf et al. (2007) from one
to many risky assets through a strong correlation assumption. We derived equilibrium asset prices
and found them to depend on the asset’s fundamental value, a risk premium, a positive skewness
premium, an ambiguity robustness premium, and the market’s level of optimism. We also provided
a simple calibration of the model with empirical data on the global market portfolio and found that
it can explain the magnitude of the observed equity premium while generating a low risk-free rate.
36

We believe there are many novel questions and avenues for research that warrant further study.
One promising research agenda may include work that addresses the basic question of ‘when’ do
biases matter. These include questions like: What types of games or institutions are robust to
systematically biased agents? Under what conditions do markets fail when traders are
systematically biased? Under what conditions can biases produce Pareto efficient outcomes?
Another promising line of research might address the question of ‘how’ do biases matter. How
does behavior under different institutions change if agents are systematically biased? How does
systematic bias affect the welfare of biased and unbiased agents?
A third line of research could apply QRD as a ‘robustness check’ on standard economic models.
For instance, how do biases affect economic conclusions regarding behavior in games or markets
with asymmetric information? We suspect in many cases, biases will result in simple
generalizations that keep qualitative economic predictions intact as was the case for auctions in
Section VI and for the aggregation of investor biases into market prices in Section V. But there
may also be cases where biased agents produce qualitatively different economic outcomes than
what EU predicts such as the optimal purchase of insurance at actuarially unfair prices in Section
IV, gaps between buying prices and selling prices in equilibrium in Section V, and a large equity
premium and the pricing of an asset’s skewness and robustness to ambiguity in Section VIII. As
the preceding questions illustrate, there seems to be much room for applying QRD to perform
economic analysis with security biased agents.

37

APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Proposition 1: If 𝑢(−𝑥) = −𝑢(𝑥) for all 𝑥, loss aversion holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ [0,1).
Proof: Under QRD, loss aversion implies: (1 − 𝜃/2)(𝑢(−𝑦) − 𝑢(−𝑥)) > (𝜃/2)(𝑢(𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑦)).
If 𝑢(−𝑥) = −𝑢(𝑥) for all 𝑥, the above inequality holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ [0,1). ∎
Proposition 2: The common ratio effect holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ (0,1)
Proof: Note that for Definition 3, the QRD model implies:
𝑓 ~ 𝑔 iff 𝑢(𝑦) = 𝜃(𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)).
𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′ iff 𝜃(𝑞𝑢(𝑦) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑢(0)) < 𝜃(𝑞𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑞𝑝)𝑢(0)).
Note 𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′ holds if and only if 𝜃𝑢(𝑦) < 𝜃(𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)) = 𝑢(𝑦).
This inequality holds under QRD if and only if 𝜃 ∈ (0,1). ∎
Proposition 3: The Allais paradox holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Note that for Definition 2, the QRD model implies:
𝑓 ~ 𝑔 iff 𝑢(𝑦) = 𝜃(𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑢(𝑦) + (𝑞 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)).
𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′ iff 𝜃(𝑞𝑢(𝑦) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑢(0)) < 𝜃(𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)).
Note that 𝑓′ ≺ 𝑔′ holds if and only if 𝜃𝑞𝑢(𝑦) < 𝜃(𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (𝑞 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)). Adding
(1 − 𝑞)𝜃𝑢(𝑦) to both sides of this inequality yields:
𝜃𝑢(𝑦) < 𝜃(𝑝𝑢(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑞)𝑢(𝑦) + (𝑞 − 𝑝)𝑢(0)) = 𝑢(𝑦).
Since 𝑢(𝑦) = 0 if 𝜃 = 0, this inequality holds if and only if 𝜃 ∈ (0,1). ∎
Proposition 9: Let 𝐷𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝑈(𝑔). Then present bias holds for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Let 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1). The value of each consumption plan is given by:
𝑉(𝑓) = 𝜃(𝐷𝑈(𝑓)) + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑦 and 𝑉(𝑔) = 𝜃(𝐷𝑈(𝑔)) + (1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑥.
Note that 𝑓 ~ 𝑔 and 𝐷𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝑈(𝑔) implies (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑦 = (1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑥. Next, note that
𝐷𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝑈(𝑔) implies 𝐷𝑈(𝑓 ′ ) = 𝐷𝑈(𝑔′ ), and so 𝑓 ′ ≺ 𝑔′ if and only if

(1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑦 <

(1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑥 which holds for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), given that (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑦 = (1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑥. ∎
Proposition 19: Let 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑔). Then time reduces risk aversion for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
The proof of Proposition 10 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 9 and so is omitted.
Proposition 11: Let 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑓) = 𝐷𝐸𝑈(𝑔). Then risk reduces impatience for all 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
The proof of Proposition 11 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 9 and so is omitted.
Proposition 12: Let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥. Then the fourfold risk pattern holds for all 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).

38

Proof: Under the three-factor model, for 𝑥 > 0, we have 𝐸(𝑓) ≻ 𝑓 if 𝑥𝑝 > 𝜃𝑥𝑝 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼𝑥).
For 𝛼 < 1, there is sufficiently large 𝑝 such that this inequality holds. Similarly, we have 𝑓 ≻
𝐸(𝑓) if 𝜃𝑥𝑝 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼𝑥) > 𝑥𝑝. For 𝛼 > 0, there is sufficiently low 𝑝 such that this inequality
holds. For 𝑥 < 0, we have 𝐸(𝑓) ≻ 𝑓 if 𝑥𝑝 > 𝜃𝑥𝑝 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛾𝑥). For 𝛾 > 0, there is sufficiently
low 𝑝 such that this inequality holds. Similarly, we have 𝑓 ≻ 𝐸(𝑓) if 𝜃𝑥𝑝 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛾𝑥) > 𝑥𝑝.
For 𝛾 < 1, there is sufficiently high 𝑝 such that this inequality holds. ∎
Proposition 13: Let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, and 𝛿 = 1. Then a bias toward concentration holds if
𝑛 > 1 + max(𝛽/𝛼, 𝛽/𝛾), for any 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Given 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥, 𝛿 = 1, and 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), For 𝑥 > 0, 𝑉 (𝐴) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼 + 𝛽 )𝑛𝑥
and 𝑉(𝐵) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑥. Thus, A ≻ B for 𝑥 > 0. For 𝑥 < 0, 𝑉(𝐴) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 +
(1 − 𝜃)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑛𝑥 and 𝑉(𝐵) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)𝛾𝑥. Thus, B ≻ A for 𝑥 < 0 for all 𝑛 ≥ 1. Next,
𝑉(𝐴′) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)𝛼𝑛𝑥 and 𝑉(𝐵′) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑥 for 𝑥 > 0. For 𝑥 < 0,
𝑉(𝐴′) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)𝛾𝑛𝑥 and 𝑉(𝐵′) = 𝜃𝑛𝑥 + (1 − 𝜃)(𝛽 + 𝛾)𝑥. Then for all 𝑛 > 1 + 𝛽/𝛼
A′ ≻ B′ for 𝑥 > 0 and for all 𝑛 > 1 + 𝛽/𝛾, B′ ≻ A′ for 𝑥 < 0. ∎
Proposition 14: Let 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥. Then for any 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), the sign effect holds if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛾.
Proof: We consider the case where 𝑟 > 0. The case where 𝑟 = 0 follows analogously. Under the
three-factor model, (𝑥, 𝑟) ~ (𝑦, 𝑡) if and only if 𝑥𝜃𝛿 𝑟 − 𝑦𝜃𝛿 𝑡 = (𝑦 − 𝑥)(1 − 𝜃)𝛼. In addition,
(−𝑥, 𝑟) ≻ (−𝑦, 𝑡) if and only if 𝑥𝜃𝛿 𝑟 − 𝑦𝜃𝛿 𝑡 < (𝑦 − 𝑥)(1 − 𝜃)𝛾. By substitution, (𝑥, 𝑟) ~ (𝑦, 𝑡)

implies (−𝑥, 𝑟) ≻ (−𝑦, 𝑡) if and only if 𝛼 < 𝛾. ∎
Remark: As indicated in Footnote 8, the sign effect cannot be explained by a conventional
behavioral approach that employs a loss aversion parameter in the agent’s value function. To
illustrate, suppose instead of security bias, that the agent has loss-averse preferences given by:
𝑢(𝑥) = {

𝑥,
𝜆𝑥,

𝑥≥0
𝑥<0

for 𝜆 > 1, but otherwise maximizes discounted utility. Then we have (𝑥, 𝑟) ~ (𝑦, 𝑡) if and only if
𝑥𝛿 𝑟 = 𝑦𝛿 𝑡 . In addition, we have (−𝑥, 𝑟) ≻ (−𝑦, 𝑡) if and only if −𝑥𝜆𝛿 𝑟 > −𝑦𝜆𝛿 𝑡 if and only if
𝑥𝛿 𝑟 < 𝑦𝛿 𝑡 which contradicts 𝑥𝛿 𝑟 = 𝑦𝛿 𝑡 .

39

REFERENCES
Abdellaoui, M., E. Diecidue, and A. Onculer. 2011. “Risk preferences at different Time periods:
An experimental investigation,” Management Science. 57, 975-987.
Allais, M. 1953. “Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critiques des
Postulats et Axioms de l’Ecole Americaine.” Econometrica, 21, 503-546.
Andreoni, J. and C. Sprenger. 2010. “Certain and Uncertain Utility: The Allais Paradox and
Five Decision Theory Phenomena.” Manuscript.
Angeletos, G.-M., D. Laibson, A. Repetto, J. Tobacman, and S. Weinberg. 2001. “The
hyperbolic consumption model: Calibration, simulation, and empirical evaluation.” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 47-68.
Baillon, A., H. Bleichrodt, A. Cillo. 2014. “A Tailor-made Test of Intransitive Choice.”
Operations Research, 63, 198-211.
Barberis, N.C. 2013. “Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment.”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 173-195.
Baucells, M. and F.H. Heukamp. 2010. “Common Ratio using Delay.” Theory and Decision, 68,
149-158.
Baucells, M. and F.H. Heukamp. 2012: “Probability and Time Trade-off.” Management Science,
58, 831-842.
Blavatskyy, P. 2010. “Modifying the mean-variance approach to avoid violations of stochastic
dominance.” Management Science, 56, 2050-2057.
Blavatskyy, P. 2014. “A Theory of Decision-Making under Risk as a Tradeoff between Expected
Utility, Expected Utility Deviation, and Expected Utility Skewness.” Manuscript.
Bleichrodt, H., and U. Schmidt. 2002. “A context-dependent model of the gambling effect.”
Management Science, 48, 802-812.
Bleichrodt, H., L. Chen, I. Moscati, and P.P. Wakker. 2016. “Nash was a first to axiomatize
expected utility.” Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli, and A. Shleifer. 2012a. “Salience and experimental tests of the
endowment effect.” American Economic Review, 102, 47-52.
Bordalo, P., N. Gennaioli, and A. Shleifer. 2012b. “Salience Theory of Choice under Risk.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1243-1285.
Botzen, W.J., J.C. Aerts, and J.C. van den Bergh. 2013. “Individual Preferences for Reducing
40

Flood Risk to Near Zero through Elevation.” Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Change. 18, 229-244.
Brown, J.R., M.D. Casey, and O.S. Mitchell. 2007. “Who values the social security annuity?
New evidence on the annuity puzzle.” NBER Retirement Research Center Paper NB 07-02.
Chateauneuf, A., J. Eichberger, and S. Grant. 2007. “Choice under uncertainty with the best
and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities.” Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 538-567.
Cohen, M. 1992. “Security level, potential level, expected utility: a three-criteria decision model
under risk.” Theory and Decision, 33, 101-134.
Dhami, S. 2016. Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis. Oxford University Press
Diamond, P., and B. Koszegi. 2003. “Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement.” Journal of
Public Economics 87, 1839-1872.
Diecidue, E., and P.P. Wakker. 2001. “On the intuition of rank-dependent utility.” Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty, 23, 281-298.
Diecidue, E., U. Schmidt, and P.P. Wakker. 2004. “The Utility of Gambling Reconsidered,”
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 29, 241-259.
Doeswijk, R., T. Lam, and L. Swinkels. 2017. “Historical returns of the market portfolio.”
Manuscript.
Dow, J. and S.R. Werlang. 1992. “Uncertainty aversion, risk aversion, and the optimal choice of
portfolio.” Econometrica, 60, 197-204.
Edwards, W. 1954. “The theory of decision making.” Psychological Bulletin, 51, 380-417.
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French. 1992. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns”. Journal of
Finance, 47, 427-465.
Fan, C-P. 2002. “Allais paradox in the small.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
49, 411-421.
Fox, C.R., C. Erner, and D.J. Walters. 2015. “Decision under Risk: From the Field to the Lab
and Back.” Chapter in G. Keren and G. Wu (Eds.), Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making.
Friedman, M. and L.J. Savage. 1948. “The utility analysis of choices involving risk.” The
Journal of Political Economy, 56, 279-304.
Gilboa, I. 1988. “A combination of expected utility and maxmin decision criteria.” Journal of
Mathematical Psychology, 32, 405-420.
Gjerstad, S. 2005. “Risk aversion, Beliefs, and Prediction Market Equilibrium.” Manuscript.
Halevy, Y. 2008. “Strotz Meets Allais: Diminishing Impatience and the Certainty Effect.”
41

American Economic Review. 98, 1145-1162.
Huck, S. and W. Muller. 2012. “Allais for all: Revisiting the paradox in a large representative
sample.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 44, 261-293.
Hurwicz, L. 1951. “A Class of Criteria for Decision-Making under Ignorance,” Cowles
Commission Discussion Paper, Statistics No. 356.
Incekara-Hafalir, E. and J.D. Stecher. 2016. “A Zero Effect explains deviations from Expected
Utility in Allais-type tasks.” Manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University.
Jaffray, J.-Y. 1988. “Choice under risk and the security factor: an axiomatic model.” Theory and
Decision, 24, 169-200.
Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York. Farrar, Straus, Giroux.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.”
Econometrica, 47, 263-292.
Karmarkar, U.S. 1978. “Subjectively weighted utility: A descriptive extension of the expected
utility model.” Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 21, 61-72.
Karni, E. and Z. Safra. 1989. “Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions, and the Structure
of Preferences.” Review of Economic Studies, 56, 421-434.
Keren, G. and P. Roelofsma. 1995. “Immediacy and Certainty in Intertemporal Choice.”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 63, 287-297.
Khwaja, A., D. Silverman, and F. Sloan. 2007. “Time preference, time discounting and smoking
decisions.” Journal of Health Economics, 26, 927-949.
Kim, W.C., J.H. Kim, J.M. Mulvey, and F.J. Fabozzi. 2015. “Focusing on the worst state for
robust investing.” International Review of Financial Analysis, 39, 19-31.
Koszegi, B., M. Rabin. 2006. “A model of reference-dependent preferences.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121, 1133-1165.
Koszegi, B. M. Rabin. 2007. “Reference-dependent risk attitudes.” American Economic
Review, 97, 1047-1073.
Koszegi, B., A. Szeidl. 2013. “A model of focusing in economic choice.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 128, 53-104.
Kodritsch, S. 2014. “On time-inconsistency in bargaining.” Manuscript.
Kopylov, I. 2009. “Choice deferral and ambiguity aversion.” Theoretical Economics, 4, 199-225.
Laibson, D. 1997: “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” The Quarterly Journal of
42

Economics, 112, 443-477.
Laibson, D., A. Repetto, J. Tobacman, R.E. Hall, W.G. Gale, and G.A. Akerlof. 1998. “Selfcontrol and saving for retirement.” Brookings papers on economic activity, 91-196.
Levin, J. 2006. Choice under Uncertainty. Manuscript.
Levine, D.K. 2012. Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The Ordinary versus the Extraordinary.
Open Book Publishers, United Kingdom.
Lichtenstein, S., and P. Slovic. 1971. “Reversals of preference between bids and choices in
gambling decisions.” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 46-55.
Loewenstein, G., and D. Prelec. 1992. “Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and
Interpretation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 573-597.
Lopes, L.L. 1986. “What naïve decision makers can tell us about risk.” In: Daboni, Luciano,
Montesano, Aldo, Lines, Marji (Eds.), Recent Developments in the Foundations of Utility and
Risk Theory. Reidel, Netherlands, 311-326.
Machina, M.J. 1989. “Dynamic consistency and non-expected utility models of choice under
uncertainty.” Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1622-1668.
Manski, C.F. 2006. “Interpreting the predictions of prediction markets.” Economics Letters, 91,
425-429.
Markowitz, H.M. 1959. “Portfolio selection: Efficient diversification of Investments.” Yale.
Marschak, J. 1950. “Rational behavior, uncertain prospects, and measurable utility.”
Econometrica, 18, 111-141.
Mehra, R., and E.C. Prescott. 1985. The equity premium: A puzzle. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 15, 145-161.
Meier, S., and C. Sprenger. 2010. “Present-biased preferences and credit card borrowing.”
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2, 193-210.
Nash, J.F. 1950a. “Equilibrium points in n-person games.” Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, USA, 36, 48-49.
Nash, J.F. 1950b. “The bargaining problem.” Econometrica, 18, 155-162.
Nash, J.F. 1951. “Non-cooperative games.” Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286-295.
Neilson, W.S. 1992. “Some Mixed Results on Boundary Effects,” Economics Letters, 39, 275-278
Prelec, D. and G. Loewenstein. 1991. “Decision Making Over Time and Under Uncertainty: A
Common Approach.” Management Science, 37, 770-786.
43

Prelec, D. 2006. “Rebuilding the Boat while Staying Afloat: The Modeling Challenge for
Behavioral Economics.” Journal of Marketing Research, 43, 332-336.
Quiggin, J. 1982. “A theory of anticipated utility.” Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 3, 323-343.
Regenwetter, M., J. Dana, and C.P. Davis-Stober. 2011. “Transitivity of preferences.”
Psychological Review, 118, 42-56.
Schmidt, U. 1998. “A Measurement of the Certainty Effect,” Journal of Mathematical
Psychology, 42, 32-47.
Schmidt, U. 2000. “The certainty effect and boundary effects with transformed probabilities.”
Economics Letters, 29-33.
Schmidt, U. and H. Zank. 2005. “What is Loss Aversion?” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30,
157-167.
Sydnor, J. 2010. (Over)insuring modest risks. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 2, 177-199.
Thaler, R. 2015. Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. Norton.
Tobin, J. 1958. “Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk.” The Review of Economic Studies,
25, 65-86.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. 1981. “The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.”
Science, 211, 453-458.
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. 1992. “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative representation
of uncertainty.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323.
Viscusi, W.K., J. Huber, and J. Bell. 2014. “Assessing whether there is a cancer premium for
the value of a statistical life.” Health Economics, 23, 384-396.
Wald, A. 1950. Statistical decision functions. Wiley, New York.
Webb, C.S., and H. Zank. 2011. “Accounting for optimism and pessimism in expected utility.”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47, 706-717.
Wolfers, J. and E. Zitzewitz. 2006. “Interpreting prediction market prices as probabilities.” IZA
Discussion Papers, No. 2092.

44

